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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
On Staying Open While Seeing Red: Predicting Open-Mindedness and Affect in Politics 
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Washington University in St. Louis, 2020 
Professor Alan Lambert, Chair 
 
This dissertation examines whether people who claim to be dispositionally open-minded, do in 
fact, demonstrate such open-mindedness when they are actually presented with political opinions 
that run counter to their own. In Study 1, participants rated their partisan identity and 
dispositional open-mindedness prior to reacting to a series of fictional Facebook posts that varied 
in both their political ideology and political extremity. The results of this study demonstrated that 
the most consistent predictor of “open” reactions (operationalized in terms of both cognitive 
judgements and affective reactions) to each type of Facebook post was whether it was congruent 
with the participants’ partisan identity. Importantly, this effect was never moderated by 
dispositional open-mindedness. Thus, the degree to which a participant was high (vs. low) in 
open-mindedness did not significantly attenuate partisan bias or act to increase the likelihood of 
“open” reactions to outgroup political views. Study 2 utilized a similar design, except in this case 
participants were asked to predict how open they thought they would be to the same set of 
political issues used in Study 1. The results of Study 2 demonstrated that participants predicted 
they would be most open to attitudinally consistent political views. As in Study 1, these 
predictions were not moderated by dispositional open-mindedness. This means that participants 
who rated themselves as highly open-minded were not any more likely to predict they would be 
xiii 
open to outgroup political opinions than those participants who scored themselves low in open-
mindedness. This research both builds upon and significantly extends prior work in both the 
psychological and political science literatures. The implications of these results and future 
directions are discussed.  
1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
“Open-minded” is one of the more complimentary labels that could be used to describe 
another person. In everyday language, this term is used to describe someone who is open to all 
points of view, including—and especially—ones that run counter to their own. In other words, 
being receptive to a point of view is easy if you happen to already agree. However, it is much 
harder to maintain such openness when someone is expressing a counter-attitudinal point of 
view. For example, we are impressed when a politically conservative person can appreciate and 
understand a liberal point of view and, conversely, when liberals are able to do the same with 
conservative opinions. This does not mean, of course, that such people will abandon their long-
held preferences when they are exposed to opposing arguments. Rather, “being open-minded”, in 
this context, refers to instances in which people can understand and appreciate the merits of 
differing viewpoints, as opposed to automatically rejecting it as “stupid” or “ill-informed”.  
The question of central interest in this dissertation is whether people who claim to be 
open-minded (as measured in the context of a personality inventory) do, in fact, demonstrate 
such open-mindedness when they are actually presented with opinions that run counter to their 
own. In considering these issues, I am assuming that the quality of “being openminded” is a trait-
like construct, in the sense that it refers to a relatively stable quality of the self. Before any 
further discussion of the theory and methods involved in this dissertation, it is useful to briefly 
review how I will operationalize this trait. 
Models and Measures of Trait-Based Open-Mindedness 
 In this dissertation, I operationalize open-mindedness based on two highly correlated 
individual difference measures: Perspective Taking (Davis, 1983) and Open-Minded Cognition 
(Price et al., 2015). I will discuss each in turn.  
2 
Perspective Taking 
  The Perspective Taking (PT) scale was developed as part of the Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index (IRI). The paper that initially introduced the IRI (Davis, 1983) has been cited more than 
8,000 times, making it one of the most highly cited papers in the psychological literature in the 
last forty years. The IRI is a measure of dispositional empathy that is comprised of four 
subscales: Empathic Concern, Perspective Taking, Personal Distress, and Fantasy. Of these 
subscales, the empathic concern (EC) index appears to be the most widely studied index (see 
Davis, 1994; Batson et al., 2002). This is almost certainly due to the close connection of EC to 
concepts that are familiar to the general public, such as compassion or sympathy.  
Nevertheless, the PT index has stimulated significant amounts of research in its own right 
(see Alterman et al., 2003; Bernstein & Davis, 1982; Cohen, 2010; Corcoran & Mallinckrodt, 
2000; Giammarco & Vernon, 2014; Hawk et al., 2013; Gilet et al., 2013; Leith & Baumeister, 
1998; Sevillano, Aragones, & Schultz 2007). Here, too, this index offers some obvious 
connections to concepts that are familiar to most laypeople, such as “being open-minded”. Davis 
(1983) defines PT as “the tendency to spontaneously adopt the psychological point of view of 
others” (p. 113-114). The items in the PT scale reflect this focus on cognitive perspective taking 
(e.g. “I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their 
perspective” (See Appendix A for full list of items). PT is associated with reduced 
stereotyping/prejudice (Ku, Wang, & Galinsky, 2010), greater satisfaction in romantic 
relationships (Franzoi, Davis, Young, & Richard 1985), and reduced anger in response to 
interpersonal conflict (Mohr et al., 2007).  
 As one concrete illustration of the dynamics associated with this facet of empathy, 
participants who scored high in PT were better able to understand the motives of negotiation 
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partners and thus were “able to uncover underlying interests….to craft more efficient deals with 
greater collective and individual gain” (Galinsky et al., 2008, p. 383). Thus, openness to 
understanding your adversaries’ point of view, or what the authors call a “think for your partner 
strategy”, appears to lead to better outcomes. To date, most of the evidence to indicate that PT is 
associated with open-mindedness to other viewpoints has been generated in the context of 
research on business and negotiation settings (e.g., Axtell et al., 2007; Grant & Berry, 2017; 
Parker & Axtell, 2001;). Nevertheless, it is reasonable to expect that this relationship between PT 
and open-mindedness would generalize to other contexts.  
 Somewhat surprisingly, I am not aware of any research that has directly tested the 
relationship between perspective taking and the degree to which people display openness to 
counter-attitudinal opinions. To be sure, one might presume on the basis of prior research that 
participants scoring relatively high (vs. low) in PT might be more open to hearing opposing 
political views. However, I am not aware of any studies that have directly examined this issue.  
Open-Minded Cognition 
 Price and colleagues (2015) recently developed the Open-Minded Cognition (OMC) 
scale. Given its relatively recent publication, there is comparatively less research on OMC 
compared to the PT index. However, it still represents a reasonably well-validated measure of 
open-mindedness and, as I note ahead, is significantly correlated with perspective taking. OMC 
is defined as a participant’s “willingness to consider a variety of intellectual perspectives, values, 
opinions, or beliefs—even those that contradict the individual’s opinion” (Price et al., 2015, p. 
1488). This closely corresponds with the definition of PT posed by Davis, reflecting a similar 
emphasis on cognitive consideration of other points of view. The measure is comprised of six 
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items, for instance “When thinking about an issue, I consider as many different opinions as 
possible” (see Appendix B for full scale).  
 As noted above, OMC is a much newer scale than the PT index. Nevertheless, much of 
the research that has been conducted on OMC, parallels the PT literature (Ottati et al., 2015; 
Wilson, Ottati, & Price, 2017). However, I am not aware of any research that has examined the 
general capacity for OMC to predict the degree to which participants are actually “open” to 
counter-attitudinal views.  
Analyses Clarifying the Overlap Between Perspective Taking and Open-Minded Cognition 
On intuitive grounds, one might expect the PT scale (Davis, 1983) to correlate quite 
strongly with the (newer) OMC scale (Price et al., 2015). However, the scholars who introduced 
the OMC scale do not report any data on the nature of this overlap. Indeed, Price et al. (2015) 
make no mention of PT at all. Nor am I aware of any subsequent research over the last five years 
to investigate the overlap between these two measures.  
 In the context of the present dissertation, my goal was to construct a statistically reliable 
index of open-mindedness, broadly defined. Hence, given the potentially strong overlap between 
the PT and OMC scale, it seemed useful to consider the possibility that the two scales combined 
might capture this construct better than either scale in isolation. I was able to formally examine 
the scales’ overlap using data that I had already collected in the context of studying other aspects 
of empathy and social judgment. Although my prior research was not directly related to the 
issues of concern in this dissertation, several of these studies (combined N = 3,407) measured PT 
and OMC. This provided me with the opportunity to conduct principal components analyses 
(PCAs) on these two scales to determine whether there was an identifiable component common 
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to both. Indeed, as I note ahead, the degree of overlap was high enough to suggest that the two 
scales are probably measuring the same underlying construct.1  
Summary of Analyses (N = 3,407) 
  Here I report results from eight different samples, collected via Amazon’s Mturk between 
December 2015 and June 2019. Because the results from each study were similar, I report only 
the findings from the combined sample. After reverse scoring contrait items, analyses revealed 
reasonable internal validity for both PT (α = .79) as well as the OMC scale (α =.75). As an initial 
(and informal) indication of their overlap, the internal reliability of a single index based on all 
items from both scales was slightly higher than the separate scales (α = .84). Further analyses 
revealed that the two scales were highly correlated, r(3407) = .62, p < .001.  
 Next, I ran principal component analyses (PCA) on the 13 items from both scales using 
three different rotation solutions: (a) no rotation, (b) varimax (which forces the components to be 
independent), and (c) oblimin (which allows them to be correlated; Jolliffe, 2011). All three 
approaches yielded strong evidence of one meaningful underlying component, on which all 13 
items loaded highly (all lambdas > .39). The primary component accounted for 38.34% of the 
variance. This result did not differ across rotation approaches. The pattern of loadings on this 
 
1 The analyses reported here do not purport to be a formal theoretical assertion of an underlying dimension (or 
factor) common to both scales. Such an endeavor would require far more analyses with samples even bigger than I 
have used here, and would also require consideration of correlated but conceptually distinct constructs such as 
empathic concern. Rather, my goal here is a more modest: To report some data with a moderate-sized sample that 
provides a reasonable justification for forming a composite measure of trait OM based on both scales. In a set of 
additional analyses (not reported in this dissertation) I also conducted analyses using the PT and OMC scales 
separately, and these analyses generated implications nearly identical to those reported in the main text.   
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primary component is shown in Appendix C. In summary, these analyses provide a reasonable 
basis for concluding that the degree of overlap between the two scales is fairly high and that they 
are likely measuring the same underlying construct. Hence, in the sections to follow, the trait 
index was based on an average of all 13 items.  
The labeling of this index is somewhat arbitrary. Indeed, given that the scales overlap so 
highly, one could just as easily call it “perspective taking” as to call it “open-mindedness”. 
However, the term perspective taking has some additional implications and theoretical baggage 
not relevant for present purposes (e.g., the ability to experience the world through the other 
person’s eyes.) Keeping this in mind, I use the term “Trait Open-Mindedness” (abbreviated as 
trait OM) throughout this dissertation to refer to this index. 
Brief Consideration of Other Trait Constructs 
Although trait OM is clearly most relevant to the aims of my dissertation, it is useful to 
briefly contrast this construct with other types of trait measures. Stated differently, this section 
provides a rationale for why trait OM is best fit to the aims of my research, while acknowledging 
that there are other constructs with which it might share some conceptual and statistical overlap.  
Authoritarianism 
The authoritarian construct has a long (and, often, quite contentious) history in the social 
sciences, beginning first with work by Erich Fromm (1929) and popularized in a well-known 
book by Adorno et al. (1950; see also Bass, 1955; Janowitz & Marvick, 1953; Lipset, 1959; 
Maslow, 1943; Roberts & Rokeach, 1956; Rokeach, 1948). Scholars have long proposed that 
authoritarianism is associated with cognitive rigidity and the tendency to be closed-minded to 
alternative viewpoints (e.g., Adorno, 1950; Rokeach, 1960). Given this long history, even a 
cursory review of this area is not possible (for relevant overviews see Adorno et al., 2019; 
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Altemeyer, 1988, 1998; Baars & Scheepers, 1993; Christie, 1991; Jost, 2006). However, I will 
briefly discuss a few key points that are especially relevant to present concerns.  
For purposes of my dissertation, there are two related, and quite fundamental, problems 
with using any measure of authoritarianism as a measure of trait OM. First, measures of 
authoritarianism do not directly measure this construct. In other words, authoritarianism is 
conceptually associated with closed-mindedness, but nothing in the scale actually measures this 
quality directly. This problem is inherent to all commonly used measures of authoritarianism, 
including the Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (Altemeyer, 1981). A related problem is that 
measures of authoritarianism are, by definition, measures of conservative ideology. Hence, even 
if one were able to infer a person’s degree of closed-mindedness by their scores on a measure of 
authoritarianism, such a measure would be perfectly confounded with political ideology 
(Feldman, 2013). As such, RWA is not useful as a measure of trait OM in the present research.  
Intellectual Humility 
 Intellectual humility refers to a person’s acknowledgment that their own beliefs could be 
flawed or incorrect (Leary et al., 2017; McElroy-Hetzel et al., 2019). Intellectual humility is a 
construct with a long history in philosophy and one that is commonly discussed in the context of 
open-mindedness (Adler, 2004; Gardner, 1993; Hare, 1987, 2009; Riggs, 2010; Spiegel, 2012). 
However, Leary and his co-authors (2017) have recently developed a 6-item psychological 
measure that includes items such as, “I reconsider my opinions when presented with new 
evidence” and “I accept that my beliefs and attitudes may be wrong”. IH is positively correlated 
with willingness to hear opposition views and exposure to outgroup political materials (Porter & 
Schumann, 2018) as well as Big 5 Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, and 
Agreeableness (Haggard et al., 2018; Leary et al., 2017). IH is also negatively correlated with 
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narcissism, intolerance to ambiguity, and dogmatism (Haggard et al., 2018; Leary et al., 2017). 
IH is certainly relevant to a broader understanding of how people react to outgroup opinions. 
However, the perception of one’s fallibility is distinct from the predisposition to consider other 
points of view. The former is firmly rooted in perception of the self, while the latter has little to 
do with self-concept. Hence, IH seemed to be of tangential relevance to the present research.  
Openness to Experience 
 Openness to Experience (hereinafter, OTE) is a subscale in both the Big Five Inventory 
(BFI; John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991) and the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO PI-R; 
Costa & McCrae, 1992). OTE scales measure imagination, curiosity, and attention to aesthetics 
and emotions (Costa & McCrae, 1992). However, there are longstanding disagreements as to the 
precise meaning of the construct (for a review see Woo, Saef, & Parrignon, 2015). Moreover, 
OTE encompasses a wide range of characteristics, most of which are not directly relevant to 
open-mindedness. In fact, a cross-cultural study of 104,365 participants across 63 countries 
found that PT and OTE were not significantly correlated (Chopik, O’Brien, & Konrath, 2017). 
For these reasons, OTE also seemed to be, at best, tangentially related to the issues of main 
concern here.2 
Summary 
 In my dissertation, an important goal was to measure individual differences in open-
mindedness. For reasons noted above, I operationalized this construct based on two highly 
 
2 The dissertation committee suggested including Actively Open-Minded Thinking (AOT; Haran, Ritov, & Mellers, 
2013) as another relevant scale. However, in our pilot studies AOT was not highly correlated with PT (r(65) = .24, p 
> .05) or OMC (r(65) = .28, p = .024). This was also true in both studies of the dissertation (mean r = .36). As such, 
AOT was not included in the measure of trait OM used in the dissertation.  
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overlapping measures, the PT scale from Davis’ empathy instrument (Davis, 1983) as well as 
OMC (Price et al. 2015). There are theoretical reasons to suspect that these scales might overlap 
with other constructs (see above), but the PT and OMC scales were, in combination, clearly most 
relevant to my goals.  
On the Predictive Validity of Trait-Based Approaches: A Brief Overview 
Most, if not all, research on traits must ultimately consider a critical question: Does a 
person’s score on a trait measure reliably predict specific behaviors? Research examining the 
contrast or congruency between self-reported personality and behavior has been at the forefront 
of personality research for several decades (Allport, 1966; Bem, 1972; Block, 1968, 1977; 
Bowers, 1973; Damian et al., 2019; Epstein, 1977, 1979, 1980; Fiske, 1974; Funder, 2012; 
Magnusson & Endler, 1977; Mischel, 1968, 1983; Revelle & Condon, 2015; Roberts, Walton, & 
Viechtbauer, 2006; West, 1983, for a comprehensive review, see Beck & Jackson, 2019). This 
question became particularly salient in the context of what eventually became known as the 
“person vs. situation debate” (Kenrick & Funder, 1988). A critical issue in that debate, at least in 
its initial stages, was whether traits are capable of accounting for meaningful amounts of 
variance, above and beyond that accounted for by situations (Allen & Potkay, 1973; Bem & 
Allen 1974; Epstein & O’Brien, 1985; Funder, 2006; Hogan, 1991; Kenrick & Funder, 1988; 
Mischel, 1968; Shweder, 1975).  
This literature is far too vast to adequately summarize here but a few points are worth 
emphasizing. This debate began in earnest with Walter Mischel’s 1968 book “Personality and 
Assessment”. The most well-publicized aspect of Mischel’s (1968) argument is that even the 
most well-designed personality measures would predict only trivial amounts of variance in 
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behavior, given the inherent “power” of situations to drive behavior.3 To choose just one 
example cited by Mischel, Hartshorne and May (1928) appeared to demonstrate low cross-
situational consistency in the cheating behaviors of elementary school children. When Mischel’s 
critique first appeared, many -- but certainly not all -- researchers (e.g., Allen & Potkay, 1973; 
Scheweder, 1975) agreed with Mischel’s conclusion that a trait-based theory of personality was, 
in his words, “untenable”.  
However, this position now seems to have been overstated. In the 1970s, research started 
to provide clear evidence that traits and situations exert important influence on behavior (for an 
overview, see Funder, 2003). For example, Endler and colleagues suggested that the interaction 
of personality and situational variables accounted for more variance in behavior than personality 
or situations alone (Endler, 1975,1977; Endler and Hunt 1966, 1968; Endler & Magnusson, 
1974). The interactionist approach ultimately stimulated a great deal of research by other 
scholars (e.g., Diener, Larsen, & Emmons, 1984; Geukes et al., 2017; Judge & Zapata, 2014; 
Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991; Orom & Cervone, 2009; Tett & Guterman, 2000; Van Mechelen, 
2009). For example, Mischel and Shoda (1995) proposed the Cognitive Affective Processing 
System model (CAPS) which assumes that people differ not only in their cognitive-affective 
mediating units (i.e., beliefs, goals, affect, construals), but also in how these mediating units will 
“interact with each other and with psychological features of situations” (p. 246). The interaction 
 
3 Strictly speaking, Mischel (1968) did not completely disavow the meaningfulness of all individual differences. For 
example, some of his own research appears to demonstrate powerful consistency of certain types of 
skills/achievements, most notably the ability to delay gratification (e.g., Mischel, 1961; Mischel, Shoda, Peake, 
1988).  
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of these mediating units with the psychological factors of a situation results in unique behavioral 
patterns between people who may have similar levels of a given trait.  
This interactionist approach has certainly proven to be useful. However, a strong version 
of the interactionist approach also runs the risk of downplaying the importance of considering 
traits in their own right. Stated another way: traits and situations, in their own right, have the 
potential to independently influence behavior, even while acknowledging the obvious 
importance of potential interactions (Funder, 2003). There are many research paradigms which 
demonstrate that traits (e.g., the Big Five inventory) can predict outcome variables with 
impressive effect sizes that far exceed the pessimism of Mischel’s earlier writings (Bastian, 
Burns, & Nettelbeck, 2005; Buss, 1989; Jackson et al., 2015; Lahey, 2009; Roberts et al., 2007; 
Specht, Egloff & Schmukle, 2011). For example, DeNeve and Cooper (1998) found personality 
traits such as extraversion, neuroticism, emotional stability, and locus of control were all 
predictive of subjective well-being. Another study by Paunonen (2003) demonstrated that traits 
such as neuroticism, agreeableness, and conscientiousness predicted more concrete behaviors 
including alcohol consumption and attending parties.  
On the Value of Multiple (vs. “Single-Shot”) Outcome Measures 
In addition to the matters noted above, it is also useful to make brief mention of a well-
known insight by Seymour Epstein and his colleagues. All else being equal, traits will do a better 
job of predicting a given outcome if the latter is operationalized using multiple measures as 
opposed to one measurement instance (informally, “single shot” measurements). As Epstein and 
O’Brien (1985) noted, “single behavioral acts tend to be (a) low in reliability and (b) low in 
generality. Given the low reliability of single acts, nothing can be expected to predict them well” 
(p. 532). In other words, the relationship between traits and a particular outcome tends to be 
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stronger when the predictor and outcome variables are operationalized using multiple items 
(Epstein, 1977, 1979, 1983; see also Buss & Craik, 1984; Diener & Larsen, 2009; Mesquita, 
Barrett, & Smith, 2010; Schwarz, 2007, 2012; Schwarz & Oyserman, 2001). It is also worth 
noting that averaging over time can potentially obscure some important aspects of within-person 
variability (Beck and Jackson, 2018; Beck and Jackson 2019; Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1998;).  
Will Trait OM Predict Receptivity to Counter-Attitudinal Opinions? 
 This brings us back to an issue of central concern in my dissertation: Would one expect 
participants scoring high (vs. low) on trait OM to demonstrate greater “openness” to opinions 
running counter to their own? (I will refer to open-minded behavior as “receptivity” or 
“cognitive receptivity” to differentiate it from trait OM.) In the context of politics—the central 
domain in this dissertation—this could be concretized in the following way. Suppose that a 
participant was (a) ideologically liberal and that (b) that they scored high in trait OM. Compared 
to other (equivalently) liberal participants who score low in trait OM, would we expect this 
participant to demonstrate greater receptivity to politically conservative opinions? The same set 
of issues pertains to politically conservative participants. All else being equal, would we expect 
conservatives scoring high (vs. low) in trait OM to demonstrate greater receptivity to opinions 
expressing liberal points of view?  
There is very little prior research that examines the predictive validity of trait OM for 
receptivity to counter-attitudinal views. Despite the absence of such data—or, perhaps, because 
of it—it is possible to take a range of different positions on this matter. In the discussion to 
follow, I first consider some reasons for “optimism”, in the sense that one might be confident 
that a measure of trait OM would, indeed, predict such receptivity. I then consider some reasons 
for pessimism, viz., that trait OM might not predict such receptivity to counter-attitudinal 
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opinions. To clarify, this latter pessimistic viewpoint does not simply reiterate the concerns 
raised by Mischel (and others) that traits are fundamentally incapable of predicting meaningful 
variance in behavioral reactions. Rather, this section will consider some dynamics relevant to the 
political intolerance literature which suggests (albeit indirectly) that psychometrically sound and 
conceptually meaningful measures of trait OM may not predict participants’ actual reactions to 
outgroup political views.  
Reasons for Optimism 
Mischel himself, later acknowledged that prior criticisms of trait measures were 
overstated (Mischel, 2004). As discussed in the previous section, there is ample research to 
demonstrate that trait measures can, in fact, predict behavior (e.g., Roberts et al., 2007). There is 
also evidence to demonstrate that specificity matching between predictors and criterion variables 
serves to increase predictive validity (Swann, Chang-Schneider, & McClarty, 2007). For 
example, narrower personality measures, such as need for achievement or need for 
understanding, are often better predictors of specific behaviors than more general trait measures 
like Conscientiousness or Agreeableness (Paunonen et al., 2003; Paunonen & Ashton, 2001). 
One could argue, perhaps, that trait OM measures (i.e., PT and OM) are relatively narrow in that 
they ask targeted questions about how one reacts to other’s perspectives. Thus, trait OM might 
be expected to have stronger predictive validity relative to more general trait measures.  
Admittedly, it would be possible to concretize my measure of trait OM even more, by 
specifically referencing open-mindedness to political views (e.g., “How open are you to 
politically views that are different from your own?”). Although such specificity is possible (see 
Price et al., 2015), trait-based measures of open-mindedness have historically not made reference 
to specific domains. Hence, to remain consistent with the prior research on trait-based openness, 
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my measure of this trait does not ask participants to evaluate their own levels of openness in a 
specified context. I will discuss this issue further in the general discussion. 
In the context of this dissertation, another reason for optimism lies in the relatively 
constricted time frame of the design. The studies in this dissertation took fewer than 20 minutes 
to complete, on average. Thus, participants were asked to rate their trait OM and respond to 
political opinions all within a short timeframe. For this reason alone, one might argue that my 
design would be conducive to finding strong relationships between the trait and the outcome 
variables. Stated another way, it is presumably harder to find a strong impact of the trait if the 
outcome variable was measured months or years later.4 
Reasons for Pessimism 
Even within the present design, however, there are still reasons for pessimism in the 
sense that one might not obtain a strong relationship between trait OM and receptivity towards 
counter-attitudinal political opinions. These considerations are most relevant to the political 
intolerance literature, considered below.  
Implications of the Political Intolerance Literature  
Political intolerance is defined as the unwillingness to “put up with” or allow for the 
expression of groups or ideas that one dislikes or finds objectionable (Gibson 2013, p. 46; see 
 
4 However, such an “optimistic” outcome could be interpreted in a more cynical way. Briefly, any consistency 
found between traits and outcome variables in “one shot” studies could reflect a self-consistency effect (Lecky, 
1945). In my dissertation, people who initially claim to be high in trait OM might feel motivated to be receptive 
towards outgroup views to maintain consistency. (Note that this could also occur if the order of the trait and 
outcome variables were reversed.) However, this alternative interpretation is moot as I did not find any evidence of 
such consistency in the first place.  
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also Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan, Pierson, & Marcus, 1979). Strictly speaking, political tolerance 
“has to do with what one expects of the state, not of oneself” (Gibson, 2011, p. 417). Thus, in 
this literature, tolerance indicates the degree to which a participant believes the government 
should allow a given viewpoint to be freely expressed. Nevertheless, researchers in this area 
presume that participants’ responses to these questions provide valuable information about their 
individual attitudes toward these “objectionable” views. Hence, although this area of research 
certainly does not measure “traits” in a conventional sense, it is interesting to see that issues 
relevant to theory and research on personality are pertinent here as well.  
  Beginning with Stouffer’s 1955 survey of American support for “McCarthyist” 
restrictions on the freedoms of communists, political scientists have long been interested in the 
relationship between participants’ abstract endorsements of political tolerance (e.g., I believe 
everyone should have the right to free speech) and the degree to which they agree with the rights 
of “objectionable” groups to publicly air their views (e.g., I believe the KKK should have the 
right to free speech). Although there are some complexities in this area, it is useful to highlight a 
particularly provocative implication of this work. People who claim to be in support of free 
speech -- when asked in the abstract -- show a surprising disinclination to support such freedom 
when asked about specific views (Gibson & Bingham, 1983; Kuklinksi et al., 1991; McClosky & 
Brill, 1983; Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1979; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 
1993). For example, past research has indicated that more than 90% of Americans say they 
“believe in free speech for all no matter what their views might be” (Peffley, Knigge, & Hurwitz, 
2001, p. 380), but less than 40% support allowing advocates of offensive groups such as the 
KKK to speak (Gibson, 1992; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1993).  
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One of the overarching implications of this research is that relatively “abstract” probes 
about tolerance do not always align with how people react to specific groups or ideologies. 
Notably, this is true even when these reactions are measured in the same setting in which 
participants had just indicated how broadly tolerant they are. This has potential implications for 
the kinds of results one might obtain with measures of trait OM, including the present set of 
studies. In particular, that abstract claims about open-mindedness may not necessarily predict 
responses to concrete opposing viewpoints, especially those that are strongly discrepant from the 
self.  
Summary 
 I am not aware of any research that has directly investigated whether abstract measures 
of trait open-mindedness reliably predict issue-specific receptivity to specific points of view, 
even when traits and reactions are measured in the same time frame. Even so, when this question 
is considered against the backdrop of prior research in psychology and political science, there are 
reasons for optimism or pessimism on this question, depending on which research one considers. 
On the one hand, there are several reasons to suppose that abstract measures of trait-based open-
mindedness might reliably predict behavioral reactions, especially in paradigms in which the 
outcome variable is measured shortly after the assessment of the trait.  
However, there are just as many reasons to suppose that people who claim to be open-
minded would not, in fact, demonstrate such openness when measuring their specific reactions to 
ideologically objectionable views (see, especially, the consideration of the political intolerance 
literature). One element of my dissertation was designed with this latter literature in mind. In 
particular, I varied (as a within-subject variable) the degree to which the “opposing” view was 
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extreme or relatively moderate, with the anticipation that dispositionally open participants would 
be more likely to demonstrate receptivity towards the latter class of items.  
On the Role of Affect in Open-Mindedness  
 Up this point, I have focused on the ability of trait OM to predict what might be regarded 
as a relatively “cognitive” openness to another’s point of view. However, this dissertation also 
studies the relationship between trait OM and affective reactions to counter-attitudinal views. It 
is certainly true that open-mindedness refers to a person’s tendency to consider differing 
viewpoints in a cognitive manner. However, a primary characteristic of being open-minded may 
also be the tendency to remain calm, or “keep a cool head”, when hearing opinions that one 
disagrees with, as opposed to getting angry or frustrated. I am not aware of any research that has 
explored whether affective reactions to outgroup opinions are predicted by trait OM or whether 
affective reactions are correlated with cognitive receptivity.  
This notion that affect may be a central component of open-mindedness is supported by 
research on the appraisal tendency framework (ATF; Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Frijda, 
1988; Han, Lerner, & Keltner, 2007; Horberg, Oveis, & Keltner, 2011; Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 
2001; Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1996). The basic idea of this approach is that different 
types of emotions (even when they share the same valence) can have reliably different 
consequences for judgment and behavior (Eadeh et al., under review; Lambert et al., 2010; 
Lambert, Eadeh, & Hanson, 2019). Of greatest interest here, anger has been found to lead to 
increased heuristic processing, including reliance on experts and stereotypes (Bodenhausen, 
Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). In the specific 
domain of politics, studies have shown that anger leads to greater reliance on partisan labels (i.e., 
endorsing a candidate based on party membership rather than issue agreement) (Bodenhausen, 
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Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Huber et al., 2015; Parker & Isbell, 2010; Weeks, 2015;). Thus 
affect, and anger in particular, can be expected to influence how receptive a participant is to 
counter-attitudinal points of view. Although current measures do not adequately capture the 
affective side of open-mindedness, it seems likely that people who are high (vs. low) in trait OM 
would be less likely to display negative affect or get angry when exposed to opposing views.  
 More recent studies in the political intolerance area have also demonstrated that affect -- 
and hostility-related feelings in particular -- plays a role in influencing the level of tolerance 
shown toward outgroups (Halperin et al., 2013; Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 
2009; Kuklinski et al., 1991; Marcus et al., 2006;). For instance, a recent study of Israeli 
participants found that group-based hatred (i.e., feelings of hostility) was the strongest predictor 
of political intolerance for Palestinian Citizens of Israel (PCIs; Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & 
Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009). In this case, political intolerance was measured in terms of whether 
participants thought PCI groups should be outlawed, phone-tapped, or allowed to speak on 
television, and whether PCIs should be allowed to vote in elections, to be elected to parliament, 
or to be elected prime minister. Affective hatred towards Palestinians was a stronger predictor of 
intolerance than commonly posed predictors such as support for democratic norms, ingroup 
identification, religiosity, education, political orientation, and education. This suggests that affect 
plays a strong role in influencing the way general beliefs about democracy are applied to specific 
targets. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that negative affect may play some role in diminishing 
cognitive receptivity to outgroup views (see summary of predictions on p. 25 for more detail). 
Summary 
Prior research does indicate that emotions, such as anger, have reliable consequences for 
judgment and behavior. However, I know of no studies that have examined the relationship 
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between trait OM and affective reactions to counter-attitudinal views. The current literatures on 
the ATF and the affective dynamics of political intolerance have significant implications for 
open-mindedness (e.g., Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009; Parker & Isbell, 2010). 
For example, studies indicate that anger leads to increased reliance on heuristic processing and 
partisan labels (e.g., Huber et al., 2015). This suggests that anger, and negative affect in general, 
may act to decrease receptivity. To the best of my knowledge, this dissertation is the first study 
to examine the affective dynamics of open-mindedness.  
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Chapter 2: Study 1 Introduction 
The overarching question tested in Study 1 was whether people who rate themselves as 
open-minded would actually respond in a more open-minded way to political viewpoints that run 
counter to their own. As such, each participant in Study 1 was asked to consider opinions that 
were consistent as well as inconsistent with their ideological stance.  
The general methodology of the study may be summarized as follows: In the initial part 
of the study, I assessed participants’ partisan identities (i.e., whether they identified as a 
Democrat or Republican) as well as their level of trait OM. Participants then read and reacted to 
four fictional Facebook posts in a randomized order. Two of the Facebook posts argued for 
liberal points of view. One of these views was relatively extreme and the other was a moderate 
liberal view. Similarly, two of the posts argued for conservative points of view. One of the views 
was extremely conservative and the other was more moderate. After reading each Facebook post, 
participants rated their cognitive receptivity (i.e., the degree to which they found a point of view 
reasonable) as well as their affective reactions (i.e., happiness, anger, disgust). In the sections 
below I will provide greater detail on the use of extreme and moderate points of view, and my 
operationalization of partisan identity.  
On the Utility of Varying the Extremity of Political Opinions 
The design of Study 1 varied not only the ideology of the Facebook posts, but also the 
extremity of the opinions expressed in the posts. Half of the Facebook posts expressed opinions 
that were rated in a pilot test as politically moderate (see ahead for greater detail on pilot testing). 
The other half of the posts expressed opinions that were rated as politically extreme. Varying the 
ideology of the posts allowed for the examination of the predictive validity of trait OM for 
receptivity to ingroup (vs. outgroup) points of view. Varying the extremity of the opinions in the 
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posts allowed me to examine whether this predictive relationship changed as a function of the 
strength of the points of view judged.  
Stated another way, varying the extremity of the opinions may help to identify boundary 
conditions as to the predictive validity of trait OM for cognitive and affective reactions. For 
example, when participants are reacting to extremely partisan views, the influence of trait OM 
may be somewhat attenuated. This closely aligns with findings in the previously discussed 
political intolerance literature. In particular, participants are often intolerant of extreme views or 
groups despite how tolerant they may claim to be (e.g., Gibson & Bingham, 1983; Sullivan, 
Piereson, & Marcus, 1993). What is less clear from the political intolerance literature is if this 
pattern of findings remains consistent for relatively moderate outgroup views. Hence, the design 
of this dissertation allowed me to determine whether trait OM exerted a stronger influence on 
receptivity in the context of politically moderate views. I will discuss these predictions in much 
greater detail below.  
On my Operationalization of Partisan Identity  
As noted earlier, open-mindedness is most relevant when responding to opinions that run 
counter to one’s own. Hence, I needed to determine what would constitute a salient outgroup, or 
counter-attitudinal, political opinion for each participant. This was most efficiently accomplished 
by collecting approximately equal samples of participants whose general identities were strongly 
aligned with left or right-leaning political viewpoints, defined broadly. In other words, given the 
nature of the theoretical issues at stake in this dissertation, the participants of greatest interest 
were those for whom politics represented a reasonably important facet of the self. Conversely, 
participants who were not interested in politics in the first place or have only weak political 
preferences were not useful in the context of my dissertation.  
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I emphasize this point here because in other theoretical contexts, one would normally 
want to use a measurement technique that retains the continuous nature of political preferences. 
In this particular context, however, the nature of “being open-minded” was most interesting to 
study when one could assess how people reacted to points of view that oppose their strongly held 
views. Hence, while I am cognizant of the potential loss of information (and potential artifacts) 
by categorizing inherently continuous variables (Altman, 2014; MacCullum et al., 2002; 
Maxwell and Delaney, 1993; Sarle,1995; West, Aiken, & Krull, 1996) the approach taken here 
appears to be well-justified. 
A Note on Partisan Identity vs. Political Ideology  
In this context it was also important to make a distinction between two different ways of 
conceptualizing and measuring political identity. Partisan identity refers to a participants’ 
political party membership and strength with which this identity is held (Huddy, Mason, & 
Aarøe, 2015). In the United States, partisan identity is most commonly measured on a continuous 
scale ranging from some variation of Extremely Strong Democrat to Extremely Strong 
Republican (Bankert, Huddy & Rosema, 2017). These measures also typically include options 
for participants to list other party affiliations (e.g., “Independent” or “no party affiliation”). In 
contrast, political ideology refers to the various political beliefs that a person holds (Jost, 
Federico, & Napier, 2009). Political ideology is typically measured using either a bipolar (i.e., 
“left-right”) liberal to conservative scale or by asking participants to rate their preferences for 
specific policies (Jost, 2006; Kroh, 2007).  
As one might expect, past research has demonstrated a reliable relationship between 
partisan identity and political ideology (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2006; Campbell et al., 1960; 
Bartels, 2002; Druckman, Peterson, & Slothus, 2013; Huddy, 2015). This means, for example, 
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that Americans who strongly identify with Democrats -- a party historically associated with 
liberal ideologies – tend to express more positive attitudes towards liberal (vs. conservative) 
points of view.  
These considerations raise a very important issue, with which political scientists/ 
psychologists have grappled for many decades: There are many different ways to measure a 
person’s political views, each with advantages and disadvantages (Huddy, Mason, & Aarøe, 
2015; Jost 2006). One relevant issue is a “bandwidth” tradeoff. For example, asking a person 
about their attitudes towards government-sponsored healthcare has the advantage of specifying 
their appraisal of a particular politically relevant issue. However, it is also true that a wealth of 
other considerations may determine a person’s appraisal of this policy, some of which may have 
nothing to do with political ideology. The use of broader measures (e.g., self-ratings along a 
strongly liberal to strongly conservative) continuum has the advantage of focusing on general 
self-identification. However, two people may give identical ratings (e.g., “moderately liberal”), 
but define this phrase in different ways.  
In short, there is no such thing as a perfect measure in this, as well as in other domains of 
the social sciences. In other contexts, the somewhat obvious solution is to have all participants 
fill out a diversity of measures and then calculate a composite (i.e., mean) score. Alternatively, 
one could take a more complicated approach and construct individual measures of correlated, but 
distinct, dimensions of ideology (e.g., economic vs. social liberalism).  
In my particular case, however, I was constrained by an important practical 
consideration. In particular it was important to minimize participants’ awareness of my interest 
in their partisan identity, in order to avoid unwanted demand effects (Mummolo & Peterson, 
2019). Thus, the prescreen had to be structured so that participants would not be able to easily 
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discern at the outset of the study that I was especially interested in their political views. Hence, I 
used one item to measure partisan identity so that this variable would not stand out from the rest 
of the questions in the prescreen.   
Given the necessity of choosing just one item, my reading of the literature is that partisan 
identity would serve my purposes fairly well. Indeed, several studies suggest that partisan 
identity is a highly salient aspect of the self that predicts a broad set of behaviors in its own right 
(Gerber et al., 2010; Greene, 1999, 2004; Huddy, 2013; Huddy & Bankert, 2017; Johnston, 
2006). Of particular relevance is a highly cited paper by Goren (2005) which presented 
converging lines of evidence that partisan identity can often be more useful in predicting 
politically oriented outcomes than political ideology. For example, Goren found that partisan 
identity was more stable than abstract political ideologies (e.g., beliefs about equality or family 
values). He also demonstrated that although deep-seated political principles do influence 
ideological beliefs, this was not the case for partisan identity. Thus, partisan identity is highly 
resistant to change, and the strength of this identity often operates independent from political 
beliefs. A subsequent study by Goren, Federico, and Kittilson (2009) also demonstrated that 
partisan identity cues strongly influenced participants’ support for or opposition to various issues 
and values. Based on this research, I judged a single-item measure that focused on partisan 
identity to be appropriate for present purposes. However, I included several manipulation checks 
in both studies to verify this assertion (see below).  
Overview of Pre-Screening Procedure 
As I have stated, I was only interested in collecting a sample of participants who felt 
strongly about their political views. Thus, I needed to be able to efficiently gather a sample of 
participants that met these criteria. Toward this end, I used a pre-screening task in the beginning 
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Study 1 to “screen” participants out on the basis of their partisan identity (i.e., those who didn’t 
strongly identify with the Democratic or Republican party). The pre-screen asked about their 
age, race, gender, religion, education, and political party preference (see Appendix D). Political 
party preference was rated on the following scale: 1 (Extremely Strong Democrat), 2 
(Moderately Strong Democrat), 3 (Lean Democrat), 4 (Independent), 5 (Lean Republican), and 7 
(Extremely Strong Republican). Participants were also able to indicate that “None of these labels 
apply to me”. I only accepted participants who identified themselves at the extreme ends of the 
scale. Specifically, the participants who identified themselves as “Extremely Strong” or 
“Moderately Strong” Democrats or Republicans. Participants who gave any other answer for 
partisan identity were told they did not meet the necessary demographic criteria to continue the 
study.   
Summary of Predictions for Study 1 
Study 1 tested a series of hypotheses across three dependent variables. The first 
dependent variable was what I called cognitive receptivity. This variable measured the degree to 
which participants found the point of view expressed in a given Facebook to be well-reasoned or 
persuasive (see below for greater detail). A second dependent variable measured participants’ 
positive affective reactions to each Facebook post. The third dependent variable measured 
participants’ negative affective reactions to each Facebook post. I expected these variables to be 
significantly correlated with each other, but also believed they represent theoretically distinct 
measures of participants’ reactions to counter-attitudinal views. As I will show in the results 
section, the pattern of correlations supported this notion. The dependent variables were 
correlated, but the magnitude of these correlations was quite small. As such, I will present the 
hypotheses and analyses for cognitive receptivity and affective reactions separately.  
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For each of these three outcome variables, I used the multivariate general linear model 
(GLM) option in SPSS to analyze my data. These analyses involved a total of four variables. 
Two of these variables—trait OM and partisan identity--represent between-subject factors and 
refer to characteristics of the participants. The other two variables, both of which were within-
subject factors, refer to the qualities of the Facebook posts: Post ideology (i.e., whether they 
represented liberal or conservative points of view), and post extremity (i.e., whether the 
viewpoint in question was ideologically moderate or extreme). I will discuss my predictions for 
each type of dependent variable separately. 
Cognitive Receptivity  
First, I predicted that participants would be most receptive to Facebook posts that were 
consistent (vs. inconsistent) with their partisan identity. For example, I expected Democrats to be 
more receptive to liberal (vs. conservative) posts. Conversely, Republicans should be more 
receptive to conservative (vs. liberal) posts. This hypothesis corresponds to a predicted partisan 
identity X Facebook post ideology interaction. This predicted two-way interaction should be 
qualified further by Facebook post extremity, such that the tendency to embrace ideologically 
consistent (vs. inconsistent) posts will be stronger if those posts are extreme than if they are 
moderate. This second prediction corresponds to a predicted three-way interaction involving 
partisan identity, Facebook post ideology, and Facebook post extremity.  
The third prediction was the most theoretically important as it reflects the hypothesized 
effect of participants’ levels of open-mindedness (i.e., trait OM ) with respect to their reactions 
towards different types of Facebook posts. Recall that all participants were presented with four 
different types of posts, in randomized order, as part of a 2 (post ideology: liberal vs. 
conservative) x 2 (post extremity: extreme vs. moderate) within-subject design. The theoretical 
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issues at stake differ as a function of both of these within-subject factors, but it easiest to grasp 
these issues if we begin with ideologically consistent posts.  
In the prior discussion, I framed “open-mindedness” as being characterized by openness 
to views that run counter to one’s own. For the ideologically consistent posts, of course, we are 
talking about something else entirely, namely, viewpoints towards which participants will likely 
be highly receptive. Thus, Democrats should naturally be inclined to be “open” to liberal posts, 
regardless of whether these posts are moderate or extreme. A conceptually analogous state of 
affairs applies to Republicans. Here, such participants should be open to conservative posts, both 
moderate and extreme. Consequently, I did not predict any significant effects of trait OM for 
either moderate or extreme ideologically consistent posts. 
Next consider the ideologically inconsistent posts, which were the posts of greatest 
interest in my dissertation. In these cases, one might expect trait OM to attenuate participants’ 
tendencies to reject these views out of hand. However, recall that within the ideologically 
inconsistent posts, one post will be moderate and the other extreme. For posts that are both 
ideologically inconsistent and extreme, I did not expect trait OM to moderate partisan bias. In 
this case, it seemed more likely that participants would always reject these kinds of posts, 
regardless of whether they were high or low in trait OM. Stated another way, posts that are 
extreme and inconsistent with participants’ views should tend to always fall outside of 
participants’ “latitude of acceptance” (Hovland, Harvey & Sherif, 1957), even among those who 
scored high in trait OM. 
Finally, consider the ideologically consistent posts expressing moderate views. In this 
case, I did predict that trait OM would moderate the effects of partisan bias such that cognitive 
receptivity to outgroup views would be higher for those who scored high (vs. low) in trait OM. 
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In the case of Democrats, for example, their tendency to reject moderately conservative posts 
should be attenuated among participants who scored relatively high (vs. low) in trait OM. A 
conceptually analogous prediction pertained to the Republican participants. Here, their tendency 
to reject moderately liberal posts should be less pronounced among participants who scored high 
vs. low in trait OM. As implied by this line of reasoning, the role of trait OM as a moderator 
should be relatively circumscribed: This trait should only play a role in qualifying cognitive 
receptivity when the posts are inconsistent with participants’ own partisan identity, and when 
these posts are moderate. Statistically, this prediction corresponds to an expected interaction 
involving all four variables (i.e., partisan identity, trait OM, Facebook post extremity and 
Facebook post ideology. 
Hypotheses Concerning Affect 
The prior hypotheses concerned the ability of trait OM to predict cognitive reactions to 
the Facebook posts. A distinct but related set of questions posed in this dissertation concern the 
relationship between affect and open-mindedness. At the broadest level, I expected to find that 
participants would feel positively toward posts that were ideologically consistent and feel 
negatively toward those that were inconsistent (i.e., partisan identity X Facebook post ideology 
interaction). As with receptivity, this interaction should be qualified by post extremity, such that 
the tendency to feel positively toward ideologically consistent (vs. inconsistent) posts would be 
stronger if those posts were extreme than if they were moderate. Similarly, the tendency to feel 
negatively toward ideologically inconsistent (vs. consistent) posts should be stronger if those 
posts were extreme (vs. moderate). For both affective variables, this corresponds to a predicted 
three-way interaction involving partisan identity, Facebook post ideology, and Facebook post 
extremity.  
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The unique contribution of this dissertation lies in the examination of whether trait OM is 
a good predictor of affective reactions to counter-attitudinal viewpoints. For both affect 
variables I predicted a four-way interaction between trait OM, partisan identity, Facebook post 
ideology, and post extremity. (Note that as with cognitive receptivity, the effect of trait OM on 
positive or negative affect toward ideologically consistent posts was not of great theoretical 
interest.) For the ideologically inconsistent posts, I predicted that participants would report high 
levels of negative affect toward extreme outgroup views regardless of whether they scored high 
or low in trait OM. Thus, I predicted that trait OM would not lessen the influence of partisan bias 
on affective reactions. Likewise, I expected that participants would report low levels of positive 
affect toward extreme outgroup views regardless of whether they scored high or low in trait OM. 
 For moderate, ideologically inconsistent posts I predicted that trait OM would moderate 
the effects of partisan bias such that negative affect toward outgroup views would be lower for 
those who scored high (vs. low) in trait OM. For example, Democrats’ tendency to feel 
negatively toward moderately conservative posts should be attenuated among participants who 
scored relatively high (vs. low) in trait OM. For positive affect, I made an analogous prediction 
that trait OM would moderate the effects of partisan bias such that positive affect toward 
outgroup views would be higher for those who scored high (vs. low) in trait OM.  
Exploratory Analyses Regarding of Affective Moderation 
The final set of analyses conceptualized affect in a manner somewhat different than the 
previous discussion. Here I considered the role that affective reactions may play in moderating 
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the influence of trait OM on cognitive receptivity.1 Thus, for both affective states I predicted a 
moderated moderation effect (Hayes, 2018) in the form of a three-way interaction of affect 
(positive or negative), partisan identity and trait OM on cognitive receptivity. The nature of this 
potential effect is most easily grasped in a diagram, see Figure 1. As this figure shows, I 
expected the degree to which affect, aroused in the context of an outgroup point of view, might 
diminish the tendency for participants who scored high (vs. low) in trait OM to be receptive. 
Thus, trait OM moderates the relationship between partisan identity and cognitive receptivity and 
negative affect moderates this moderation.  
The first set of analyses tested whether the degree to which an outgroup post aroused 
negative affect would reduce the tendency for high trait OM participants to be more receptive to 
outgroup views relative to those who scored low in trait OM. Stated another way, it tested 
whether negative affect would further moderate the two-way interaction between trait OM and 
partisan identity. The second set of analyses examined whether positive affect further moderated 
the two-way interaction between trait OM and partisan identity. In this case, I tested whether the 
degree to which an outgroup Facebook post aroused positive affect would increase the tendency 
for high trait OM participants to be more receptive to outgroup views relative to those who 
scored low in trait OM. I used PROCESS (Hayes, 2017) to run these analyses for each Facebook 
post type (i.e., strong liberal, strong conservative, moderate liberal, moderate conservative).  
 
 
1 Importantly, the analytic approach taken here was noted in my pre-registration, but was explicitly noted as 
exploratory. Hence, while these analyses are not post-hoc, they should be properly framed as investigating issues for 
which I did not have a strong, a priori expectation in the form of a formal hypothesis. 
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A General Note About Analytic Techniques 
 As noted in an earlier section, I had an a priori interest in the moderate (as opposed to 
extreme) Facebook posts, insofar as I predicted an interaction of trait OM and participants’ 
partisan identity for these posts. In the context of examining the moderate liberal posts, for 
example, I predicted that participants’ reactions would vary as a function not only of their 
partisan identity but also their levels of trait OM. I also predicted a conceptually similar 
interaction for the moderate conservative posts. In the case of the extreme Facebook posts, 
however, I predicted only a main effect of partisan identity, with no role of trait OM.  
 Framing my predictions in this way -- by highlighting different types of predictions for 
different types of posts -- is conceptually straightforward and easy to understand. Indeed, this is 
the way that I presented these predictions in the pre-registration. This type of framing, by 
extension, suggests that it would be important to compare the results from separate analyses on 
each of the four classes of Facebook posts. For this reason, I report these analyses in the section 
to follow. Nonetheless, conducting separate analyses on the four posts does not allow me to 
simultaneously test for the presence of potential interactions involving between and within-
subject factors. For example, I also predicted that the impact of participants’ partisan identity 
(Democrat vs. Republican) should vary as a function not only of the ideology of the Facebook 
posts, but also the extremity of those posts.  
 In short, it was also useful to report an initial omnibus analysis involving all of the 
variables in my design—within as well as between—prior to presenting the separate regression 
analyses on each of the Facebook posts. This omnibus analysis is relatively complex, as it 
involves (a) two different types of between-subjects factors, one of which was categorical and 
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the other continuous (partisan identity and trait OM, respectively) along with (b) two within-
subject variables, both categorical, and both pertaining to the qualities of the Facebook posts).  
Although there are likely to be several different options for analyses in this case, I used a 
variation of the multivariate GLM option in SPSS. In this approach, partisan identity was 
modeled as a categorical predictor, trait OM was modeled as a (standardized) continuous 
predictor along with the two within-subject factors of Facebook post type, both categorical 
(ideology and extremity). In the context of this analysis, trait OM was technically treated as a 
covariate. However, in the output SPSS provides conceptually interpretable (and in the context 
of my dissertation, relevant) tests of all possible main effects and interactions, including but not 
limited to trait OM. For example, it allowed me to test for the presence of the predicted 3-way 
partisan identity x Facebook post ideology x Facebook post extremity interaction, while 
controlling for individual differences in trait OM. This analysis allowed me to test for the 
presence of a higher-order interaction involving trait OM in combination with partisan identity 
and the characteristics of the Facebook posts.2  
In summary, I analyzed the primary data in two ways. In the initial analyses I report the 
results of a multivariate GLM (see above) and I then report follow-up regression analyses on 
each of the four classes of Facebook posts.  As I note ahead, the implications of the omnibus 
analysis nicely complemented that of the regression analyses, and vice versa. I make note of this 
 
2 It could be possible to run an even more complex omnibus test which incorporated not only the between and within 
subject factors noted above, but also the three types of outcome variables (cognitive receptivity, positive affect, 
negative affect) in a single analysis. However, such an analysis would be extremely difficult to interpret and even 
more laborious to report. Also, this would almost certainly necessitate a series of subsequent analyses for each of the 
three outcome variables, and this is precisely what I ended up doing in the main analyses. 
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latter point because, even though there are advantages and disadvantages to both approaches, 
they ended up generating the identical conclusions.  
Overview of Sample Construction 
 In this section I provide a brief summary of several related issues as they bear on the final 
sample size of Studies 1 and 2. Some of these issues are complex but it is important to emphasize 
three important points at the outset: First, the sample sizes that I ultimately collected were the 
largest that I could have possibly obtained, given the constraints of my design and the source of 
participants from which I was drawing. Second, although the samples were somewhat smaller 
than I initially intended, this fact does not appear to pose a major concern with respect to the 
interpretation of the results that I ultimately obtained. As a third and related point, I found a 
remarkably parallel set of findings from both studies, despite some methodological differences 
between them.  
 In the sections below I provide additional information about these matters although, for 
practical reasons of space (and expositional clarity), this information is provided in summary 
form only. Readers interested in further details may consult Appendix E. 
Preliminary Power Analysis 
 The conceptualization and design of this dissertation were firmly grounded in a priori 
theory on perspective taking. However, the design, itself, was relatively novel. In other words, I 
was not aware of any other research (including my previous work) that had studied these matters 
in precisely the way that I did here. Hence, unlike some other types of dissertations, estimates of 
the sample needed to detect the predicted effects (i.e., a priori power analyses) could not be 
drawn directly from published research.  
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Therefore, it seemed prudent to conduct a pilot study in the service of generating 
reasonable estimates of the needed sample. In this context, I am not referring to the preliminary 
studies that were used to construct the experimental stimuli; information about those initial pilots 
are provided in the Method section of this dissertation. Rather, I refer here to a “trial run” of 
Study 1 using the measures and methods that were identical to that used in Study 1. The pilot 
study in question was run before writing the pre-registration for the formal study and was never 
intended to be published.  
 Using a set of calculations described in Appendix E, I used G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) 
and the data from the pilot in question (n = 74) in the service of generating what I deemed at the 
time to be a reasonable estimate of the needed sample. I am cognizant of the fact that the 
relatively small size of this pilot necessarily limits the accuracy of the power analyses (Moore at 
al., 2011), However, I was also aware of the possibility that a large pilot test might have unduly 
drained the limited number of acceptable participants on Mturk.   
The power analysis led me to estimate that I needed a total sample of 229 participants in 
both studies. Based on the design of this dissertation, I needed the samples to be balanced, not 
only in terms of Republicans and Democrats but also between the “Extreme” and “Moderate” 
participants within each party. As such, I intended to recruit 58 participants in each of the four 
partisan identity categories (i.e., 58 Extremely Strong Democrats, 58 Moderately Strong 
Democrats, 58 Moderately Strong Republicans, 58 Extremely Strong Republicans). 
Relevant Screening Procedures 
 Now that I have laid out the intended size of my sample, it is necessary to briefly 
summarize an “oversampling procedure” -- which was preregistered -- that was needed to 
account for a small, but non-trivial, number of non-usable participants on Mturk. It is unrealistic 
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to assume that every participant is devoting reasonable attention to the present studies; however, 
this concern is somewhat greater for online studies (Barenboym, Wurm & Cano, 2010; Clifford 
& Jerit, 2014; Dandurand, Shultz, & Onishi, 2008). Several recent studies suggest that online 
samples obtained from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (along with other sources) contain a non-
trivial number of participants who use bogus IP addresses in order to circumvent U.S. residency 
requirements. Workers circumventing this rule are sometimes called "farmers" (Moss & Litman, 
2018) and often have an extremely poor command of the English language (see also Kennedy et 
al. 2018). In Studies 1 and 2 (both of which were preregistered), I used a set of a priori exclusion 
criteria to screen out such participants, in advance of any other data analyses. Readers interested 
in more on the exact exclusion criteria and procedures may consult Appendix F. (The protocol to 
be described below does not include the exclusion of “repeat” participants who attempt to take 
the survey twice. This is a more straightforward and relatively rare issue, and these participants 
are easily detected and excluded.) 
In past studies in our lab, the typical exclusion rate for farmers or other problematic 
participants for any given sample is about 15%. I used the following two-step procedure to 
determine and obtain the needed sample size. First, I used a priori power analyses to determine 
the needed sample size of valid participants (see earlier discussion). Second, as part of an 
“oversampling” process, I determined the total number of participants I would need to initially 
collect in order to reach that target sample, taking into account the expected 15% exclusion rate.  
We have used this procedure in previous studies in our lab, and it generally worked well 
in my dissertation. However, I unexpectedly ran into one challenge that appeared to be specific 
to my design. In both studies of this dissertation I encountered an unexpectedly high rate of 
“farmers” among participants claiming to be extremely strong and moderately strong 
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Republicans. (I cannot be sure why this occurred, but it is possible that such workers perceived 
that they would be more likely to “slip in” to my study if they posed as this type of participant.) 
The precise sampling procedure used to address this issue for each study is discussed in greater 
detail in the sections to follow. 
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Chapter 3: Study 1 Methods 
3.1 Sample 
I intended to collect a sample of 232 participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mturk). 
In order to account for the expected 15% exclusion rate, I initially recruited 264 participants. As 
noted earlier, there was an unexpectedly high rate of “farmers” and “repeaters” among the 
Republican participants. As such, it was necessary to collect data from 368 participants to obtain 
the necessary sample. In total, 136 participants were excluded from analyses in accordance with 
the criteria laid out in Appendix F.  
Thus, the final sample was comprised of 229 participants (64% female and 78% white). 
Due to the unusually high number of farmers, I was only able to recruit 49 Extremely Strong 
Republicans. As a result, I adjusted my sample to maintain the desired balance between 
Democrats and Republicans, as well as the balance of Extremely and Moderately strong 
partisans. The final sample was as follows: 49 Extremely Strong Republicans, 65 Moderately 
Strong Republicans, 65 Moderately Strong Democrats, and 50 Extremely Strong Democrats. In 
this sample any comparison between Democrats and Republicans involved nearly equal samples 
(114 and 115), and this sample included nearly equal counts of Moderate Democrats and 
Republicans (65 vs. 65) and Extremely Strong Democrats and Republicans (50 vs. 49). See 
Appendix G for more information on the sample and data collection.  
3.2 Overview of Procedure  
 After providing informed consent, participants completed both the individual difference 
block and the Facebook post block. The order in which these blocks were presented was 
completely randomized (see Appendix H for a schematic representation of study design). The 
individual difference block included the two measures of central interest to this dissertation, 
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Open-Minded Cognition (OMC; Price et al., 2015) and Perspective-Taking (PT; Davis, 1983). 
This block also contained a set of scales that were not of central concern and served as 
distractors (i.e., were included to make my interest in open-mindedness less obvious). These 
scales included measures of Actively Open-Minded Thinking (AOT; Haran, Ritov, & Mellers, 
2013), Empathic Concern (EC; Davis, 1983), and the Ten Item Personality Measure (TIPI, 
Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003).  
The individual difference block also included two measures of political ideology, Right-
wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Mavor, Louis, & Sibley; 2010) and Social Dominance 
Orientation (SDO; Ho et al.; 2015). I used these scales to verify that responses to the single-item 
partisan identity measure were consistent with responses to SDO and RWA (see Appendix I for a 
full description of the items in all scales). If my single-item measure was valid, I expected to see 
that Republican participants scored significantly higher on both RWA and SDO compared to 
Democrats.  
In the Facebook post block (see Appendix J), participants read and responded to four 
fictional Facebook posts. Each Facebook post presented a point of view in a distinct category of 
ideology and extremity (i.e., strong liberal, moderate liberal, strong conservative, moderate 
conservative). Participants read one post from each category in a randomized order. (For purpose 
of clarity, Facebook posts categories will always be referred to as liberal or conservative and 
participant partisan identity will be referred to as Democrat or Republican). 
Within each of the four Facebook posts categories, I created two posts arguing for two 
distinct points of view that were matched in their ideology and extremity. For example, in the 
extreme liberal category, one post argued for canceling student loan debt and the other for 
banning assault rifles. Participants were randomly assigned to view only one of the posts in each 
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ideological category. Thus, participants read four total posts, one post in each ideological 
category, and within each category participants were randomly assigned to see one topic out of 
two possibilities. I used multiple posts to expand the generalizability of any findings. The posts 
within each category were extensively pilot tested to ensure they did not significantly differ on 
any of the dependent variables (see below for greater detail on posts and pilot tests). After 
reading each post participants expressed their affective as well as attitudinal reactions to each 
point of view. Finally, participants completed a demographics section.  
3.3 Measures 
Trait Open-Mindedness (Trait OM)  
  Trait OM was measured using the Perspective Taking scale of the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index and the Open-Minded Cognition scale. As discussed earlier, our prior studies 
demonstrated that these scales loaded on the same component. Hence, I chose to use their 
combined means to measure trait OM (α = .87). Note that PT was answered on a scale ranging 
from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 6 (Strongly Agree), and OMC was answered on a scale from 1 
(Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). Thus, prior to combining the scales, I standardized the 
mean for each measure. See Appendices A and B for a complete listing of these items. 
Partisan Identity  
For reasons outlined above, partisan identity was operationalized as a categorical 
variable. This was measured using a single item in the pre-screen (see Appendix D for full pre-
screen) in which participants rated their political party affiliation on a scale from 1 (Extremely 
Strong Democrat) to 7 (Extremely Strong Republican). As stated before, I only accepted 
participants who identified as Extremely or Moderately Strong Democrats or Republicans.  
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Facebook Posts  
 Participants read and responded to four fictional Facebook posts (see Appendix J for 
posts and instructions). The posts varied across four levels of political ideology and extremity 
(i.e., strong conservative, strong liberal, moderate conservative, moderate liberal). The viewing 
order of the four types of Facebook posts, as well as the specific posts each participant read, 
were randomized. I further structured the design to ensure that equal numbers of Republicans 
and Democrats saw each post.  
 Pilot Tests. The development of the Facebook posts required extensive pilot testing. 
First, I tested a large list of political opinions (e.g., We spend too much money on the military; 
Social security should be privatized) to identify a subset that were clearly recognized by an 
ideologically diverse sample as strongly as well as moderately conservative and liberal (n = 82; 
see Appendix K for full list of items). In the second pilot test (n = 75), I selected 18 opinions to 
develop into longer statements (e.g., “We have to protect the little guy. We cannot let 
corporations decide how the economy will work instead of protecting the middle class. The 
government should regulate the economy to make sure Americans and their interests are 
protected.”). Participants rated how persuasive, logical, and well-reasoned they found each 
statement, as well as how strongly they agreed with it (see Appendix K for all items). From the 
second pilot study forward, I only collected data from Extremely or Moderately Strong 
Democrats and Republicans to mirror the intended sample in the final study.  
  In the final pilot test (n = 74) I created fictional Facebook posts, which included a gender-
neutral default icon, a gender and race-neutral name (i.e., Alex Johnson, Sam Jones, Jamie 
Brown, and Jordan Williams), and the text developed in the prior pilot tests. This pilot used the 
same design that was employed in the full study, namely participants only saw one Facebook 
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post for each of the four ideological categories. Participants rated the posts on the exact set of 
dependent variables used in the final study. The third pilot was used to narrow the design to two 
Facebook posts in each ideological category as well as for power analyses (see Appendix J for 
final Facebook posts).  
Dependent Variables 
There were three classes of dependent variables: cognitive receptivity, positive affect, 
and negative affect. The full text of each question used for these dependent variables is available 
in Appendix L.  
Cognitive Receptivity. Participants rated how persuasive, logical, and well-reasoned 
they found each post on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much so). Participants rated how 
open-minded they were to the opinions expressed in the posts on the same 0 to 100 scale. They 
then rated how willing they would be to have a follow-up conversation with the author to better 
understand their opinions on the 0 to 100 scale. Participants also rated on a scale from 1 
(Extremely Unlikely) to 7 (Extremely Unlikely) how likely they would be to “like” the post or to 
send the author a “friend request” on social media. Finally, they rated how strongly they agreed 
with the point of view in each post on a scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree).  
The last three items discussed above (i.e., “like” the post, friend request, and agreement) 
were answered using a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 to 7. In contrast, the other 5 questions 
were answered on a scale from 0 to 100. To combine each of these questions into a single 
composite measure of cognitive receptivity would have necessitated standardizing each item 
prior to calculating an overall mean (i.e., adjusting the item mean to zero, and the standard 
deviation to 1). The composite mean would also have been standardized. In the context of this 
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dissertation, standardizing the dependent variables in this way would have limited my ability to 
make theoretically meaningful comparisons across the four classes of the dependent variables.1  
Thus, to allow for the interpretation of mean differences, I only included the items answered 
from 0 to 100 in the composite measure of cognitive receptivity (mean α = .92). The results did 
not change with all items included in a standardized dependent variable. 
Affective Reactions. I measured affective reactions across a set of eight randomized 
items including happy, excited, angry, frustrated, content, annoyed, disgusted, and proud. 
Participants rated each item on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much so). These items 
were used to form two indices, one capturing positive affect (averaging across happy, excited, 
content, and proud; α = .91) and another measuring negative affect (averaging across anger, 
annoyed, frustrated, and disgusted (α = .91).
 
1 For example, I would not be able to tell if the mean cognitive receptivity for moderate liberal posts was 
significantly different from the mean receptivity for strong liberal posts.  
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Chapter 4: Study 1 Results 
4.1 Preliminary Analyses of Study 1  
Prior to reporting formal analyses for Study 1, it is useful to consider some preliminary matters 
that are either directly or indirectly relevant to those findings.  
Validity of Partisan Identity Measure 
An important desideratum in my dissertation was to create two groups of participants for 
whom their affiliation with the Democratic or Republican party represented an important aspect 
of the self. Hence, I only allowed four groups of participants to participate in the study: Those 
who identified in the prescreen as “extremely strong” or “moderately strong” Democrats and 
“extremely strong” or “moderately strong” Republicans.  
As noted in my preregistration protocol, analyses involving this variable could, in 
principle, take two approaches. One approach was to collapse over the “moderately strong” vs. 
“extremely strong” distinction, resulting in an operationalization of partisan identity with two 
levels (Democrats vs. Republicans). The other, more complicated, approach is to operationalize 
partisan identity as a 2 x 2 matrix, crossing party identification (Democrat vs. Republican) with 
extremity (extreme vs. moderate). As it turns out, the pattern of results was nearly identical 
regardless of which approach I took. Thus, for the sake of expositional clarity, I operationalized 
partisan identity with two levels, Democrats and Republicans, collapsing over whether 
participants characterized their partisan identity as extremely or moderately strong.  
Participants’ scores on the RWA and SDO scales provide converging evidence regarding 
the validity of the approach taken here. If the partitioning of participants into two groups was 
valid, one would expect these individuals to have generated much different scores on RWA and 
SDO. ANOVAs confirmed this expectation. Republicans scored far higher in RWA than 
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Democrats, F(1,227) = 210.97, p < .001, ηp2 = .48 (M = 4.21, SD = .87 vs. M = 2.42, SD = .98). 
Likewise, Republicans scored far higher in SDO than Democrats, F(1,227) = 91.79, p < .001, ηp2 
= .29 (M = 3.44, SD = 1.10 vs. M = 2.13, SD = .96). These findings validate my assumption that 
the partisan identity groups do, in fact, represent two groups of people who differ greatly with 
respect to their ideological beliefs.  
Check for Order Effects 
Recall that participants were randomly assigned to either complete the individual 
difference or the Facebook block first. It could be the case that rating one’s dispositional open-
mindedness prior to reading the Facebook posts resulted in systematic differences in the 
dependent variables. The same could be true for participants who read Facebook posts and then 
rated their open-mindedness. As a result, it is was necessary to check for order effects before 
conducting more complex analyses. An initial set of ANOVAs (see Table 1 for details) 
confirmed that there were no significant effects of order. As none of the variables differed across 
the order conditions, I did not control for order in the analyses to follow.  
4.2 Correlational Analyses 
Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations of the dependent variables. Table 3 
presents the correlations between the dependent variables across the four Facebook posts types. 
As I expected, cognitive receptivity was positively correlated with positive affect for each 
Facebook post type. However, the magnitude of these correlations was moderate. For example, 
even though cognitive receptivity and positive affect toward strong liberal posts were 
significantly correlated (r(229) = .55, p < .001), the correlation was not high enough to suggest 
that the two variables were interchangeable. The results also demonstrated that cognitive 
receptivity was negatively correlated with negative affect. However, once again, the magnitude 
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of these correlations was small. These results support my decision to analyze the three outcome 
variables separately.  
4.3 Main Analyses 
For each of the dependent variables (cognitive receptivity, positive affect, and negative 
affect), I used the multivariate general linear model (GLM) option in SPSS (see earlier 
discussion) to test the predicted main effects and interactions of (a) two between-subjects factors 
(partisan identity and trait OM), operationalized as categorical and continuous variables, 
respectively, and (b) two within-subjects factors (Facebook post ideology and post extremity). I 
used this analytic approach in three separate analyses, for each type of outcome measure.  
4.3.1 Cognitive Receptivity  
The omnibus GLM model (see Table 4) generated a main effect of Facebook post 
extremity, F(1, 225) = 11.71, p = .001, ηp2 = .05. This effect indicated that, on average, 
participants were more receptive to Facebook posts expressing moderate (M = 50.99, SD = 
26.52) as opposed to strong (M = 46.93, SD = 28.81) points of view. There was also a significant 
main effect of Facebook post ideology, F(1, 225) = 15.42, p < .001, ηp2 = .06. This main effect 
indicated that, on average, participants were more receptive to liberal (M = 52.42, SD = 28.15) 
than conservative (M = 45.51, SD = 27.18) Facebook posts. This latter finding does not take 
partisan identity into account, and, as I show ahead, it does not undermine my ability to examine 
the issues of central interest to my dissertation.  
The two-way interaction between partisan identity and Facebook post extremity was not 
significant, F(1,225) = 1.25, p = .265, ηp2 = .01. This null effect was expected since it collapses 
over whether the posts themselves represented liberal or conservative points of view. There was 
a significant two-way interaction of partisan identity and Facebook post political ideology, F(1, 
46 
225) = 168.24, p < .001, ηp2 = .43. As seen in Figure 2, Democrats were more receptive to liberal 
compared to conservative posts (M = 65.31, SD = 22.00 vs. M = 33.62, SD = 24.51), and this 
pattern was strongly reversed for Republicans (M = 39.41 SD = 27.25 vs. M = 55.49, SD = 
25.89). This analysis serves as both a manipulation check and a confirmation of my prediction 
that participants would be more receptive to posts expressing ingroup (i.e., attitudinally 
consistent) views.   
 Analyses also generated a significant three-way interaction involving partisan identity, 
Facebook post ideology, and Facebook post extremity, F(1, 225) = 23.51, p < .001, ηp2 = .10. 
These findings are presented in Figure 3. Consider first, the pattern for Democrats (top half). 
These participants were less receptive to conservative (vs. liberal) posts but this opposition was 
especially pronounced when the conservative posts were strong rather than moderate. A 
conceptually analogous pattern emerged for the Republican participants (bottom half). Here, 
these participants were less receptive to liberal (vs. conservative) posts but this opposition was 
again more pronounced when the posts expressed strong rather than moderate points of view.  
The preceding set of analyses provide a foundation for addressing issues of even greater 
theoretical interest in this dissertation: To what extent, if any, would trait OM qualify partisan-
driven bias to reject counter-attitudinal points of view? Analyses did reveal an effect of trait 
OM, but it was not what I expected: Overall, higher scores on trait OM were associated with a 
general tendency to demonstrate greater receptivity to all of the Facebook posts, F(1, 225) = 
17.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .07. Notably, this effect was not qualified by partisan identity as the two-
way interaction with trait OM was not significant, F(1,225 ) = .19, p = .667. ηp2 = .00. (The 
absence of this 2-way interaction is statistically equivalent to saying that trait OM did not 
moderate the effects of partisan identity.) Indeed, there was not a single instance in which trait 
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OM significantly interacted with the partisan identity. Conceptually, this means that whatever 
effect emerged for trait OM, it did so independent of the political views of the participants.  
There was only one instance in which trait OM interacted with any of the other variables 
in the design. This emerged in the form of an interaction involving trait OM and Facebook post 
ideology, F(1, 225) = 5.00, p = .026, ηp2 = .02. This interaction reflected that higher scores on 
trait OM were associated with greater receptivity to liberal, compared to conservative, posts. 
This effect is of limited interest as it does not include partisan identity or show that trait OM 
moderated the bias of left-leaning or right-leaning participants. Nevertheless, for the sake of 
completion, it is useful to report additional correlational analyses to further understand the nature 
of this contingency.  
Consider, first, the liberal posts. In this case, Trait OM was positively correlated with 
cognitive receptivity for these posts, regardless of whether they represented strong (r(229) = .30, 
p < .001) or moderate (r(229) = .26, p < .001) points of view. For the conservative posts, the 
relationship between trait OM and receptivity was still positive, but not statistically significant 
(r(229) = .09, p = .197 and r(229) = .04, p = .560, for the strong and moderate conservative 
posts, respectively). It is important to keep in mind, however, that these effects collapse over 
participants’ partisan identities. The pattern of greater interest is that any effects of partisan 
identity emerged independent of trait OM, a finding that I explore in more detail below.  
Additional Regression Analyses for Cognitive Receptivity. One of the more interesting 
implications of the preceding analyses is that the effects of partisan identity emerged 
independent of trait OM. The nature of this independence can also be shown in a set of separate 
regression analyses on each of the four types of Facebook posts. These analyses are, of course, 
somewhat redundant with the implications of the GLM. However, given the importance of these 
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findings, the separate regression analyses are informative (see Table 5). In these analyses, as was 
the case for the GLM, partisan identity was operationalized as a dummy-coded categorical 
variable (0 = Republican, 1 = Democrat) and trait OM was operationalized as a continuous 
variable and standardized prior to these analyses.  
Strong Liberal Posts. Democrats (vs. Republicans) showed a robust tendency to be more 
receptive to the strong liberal posts, b = .55, t(226) = 10.37, p < .001, CI [25.96, 38.15]. Of 
course, this finding can also be framed another way: Republicans were much more likely to 
reject these posts compared to Democrats. There was also a significant main effect of trait OM, b 
= .24, t(226) = 4.58, p < .001, CI [4.37, 10.95], indicating greater receptivity among participants 
scoring relatively high vs. low in trait OM. Of greater interest, and consistent with the 
implications of the GLM, there was no evidence of an interaction involving trait OM and 
partisan identity, b = -.07, t(225) = -1.06, p = .291, CI [-10.26, 3.09] for the 2-way interaction of 
trait OM and partisan identity. 
Moderate Liberal Posts. Democrats were also more receptive to moderate liberal posts 
compared to Republicans, b = .32, t(226) = 5.21, p < .001, CI [10.56, 23.41]. Here again, this can 
be framed in terms of a tendency for Republicans to reject these posts more than Democrats. As 
in the case for the extreme liberal posts, participants scoring high (vs. low) in trait OM were 
more receptive to these posts, b = .23, t(226) = 3.80, p <.001, CI [3.22, 10.16] for the main effect 
of trait OM. Also consistent with the preceding analyses, there was no evidence of an interaction 
involving trait OM and partisan identity, b = .04, t(225) = .46, p = .643, CI [-5.39, 8.71].  
Moderate Conservative Posts. For these posts, the only predictor of receptivity was 
partisan identity, with Republicans showing more receptivity compared to Democrats, b = -.30, 
t(226) = -4.64, p < .001, CI [-22.02, -8.89]. Null effects of trait OM were found both in the 
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absence of a main effect (b = .12, t(226) = 1.83, p = .069, CI [-.26, 6.84]) as well as the absence 
of an interaction with partisan identity (b = -.04, t(225) = .67, p = .671, CI [-8.76, 5.65]).  
Strong Conservative Posts. Similar to moderate conservative posts, receptivity was 
predicted only by partisan identity, with Republicans showing more receptivity compared to 
Democrats, b = -.45, t(226) = -7.59, p <.001, CI [-32.01, -18.81]. No effects of Trait OM were 
found with these analyses, either as a main effect (b = .09, t(226) = 1.43, p =.153, CI [-.97, -
6.16]) or in combination with partisan identity (b = -.01, t(225) = -.16, p =.872, CI [-7.84, 6.66]). 
 4.3.2 Positive Affect  
Here I consider a different outcome measure, the degree to which participants expressed 
positive affect towards the Facebook posts. However, the analytic approach used here, via GLM, 
was the same as for cognitive receptivity (see Table 6 for full results). (To facilitate comparison 
with the earlier analyses, I present the results of this analysis in the same order as before. As I 
report each analysis, I make brief note if the effect did, or did not, parallel that found with 
cognitive receptivity.) 
 In contrast to the receptivity analyses, these analyses did not reveal evidence of a main 
effect of Facebook post extremity, F(1, 223) = .39, p = .532, ηp2 = .00. Thus, participants did not 
express more positive affect toward moderate (M = 24.23, SD = 25.36) as compared to strong (M 
= 23.35, SD = 27.35) points of view. There was, however, a significant main effect of Facebook 
post ideology (F(1, 223) = 27.59, p < .001, ηp2 = .11) that paralleled what I found with cognitive 
receptivity. This main effect indicated that, on average, participants felt more positive affect in 
response to liberal (M = 27.64, SD = 28.02) as compared to conservative (M = 19.94, SD = 
24.69) posts.  
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The two-way interaction between partisan identity and Facebook post extremity was not 
significant, F(1,223) = .19, p = .666, ηp2 = .00. There was, however, a significant two-way 
interaction of partisan identity and Facebook post political ideology, F(1, 223) = 103.92, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .32. This effect was similar to that found with cognitive receptivity. Democrats 
expressed more positive affect toward liberal compared to conservative posts (M = 36.25, SD = 
29.40 vs. M = 13.33, SD = 20.63), and this pattern was reversed for Republicans (M = 18.95 SD 
= 22.91 vs. M = 26.60, SD = 26.13). There was also a significant two-way interaction of 
Facebook post ideology and post extremity, F(1, 223) = 6.30, p = .013, ηp2 = .03. This effect was 
not found in the analysis of cognitive receptivity. This interaction indicated that participants 
generally reported more positive affect in response to liberal (vs. conservative) posts, and this 
difference was especially pronounced for moderate (vs. strong) points of view (see Figure 4).  
Consistent with the results involving cognitive receptivity, analyses revealed a significant 
three-way interaction involving partisan identity, Facebook post ideology, and Facebook post 
extremity, F(1, 225) = 19.08, p <.001, ηp2 = .08. These findings are presented in Figure 5. 
Among Democrats (top half), participants expressed approximately equal levels of positive affect 
toward liberal posts with a pronounced decline for the conservative posts. Republican 
participants, in contrast, showed a low level of positive affect toward strong liberal posts (bottom 
half). Republicans showed similar levels of positive affect for moderate liberal and moderate 
conservative posts, and the greatest degree of positive affect for strong conservative posts.  
Unlike the cognitive receptivity analyses, the GLM did not generate evidence of a main 
effect of trait OM for positive affect, F(1, 223) = .10, p = .750, ηp2 = .00. Nor was there an 
interaction with partisan identity, F(1, 223) = .00, p = .967, ηp2 = .00. However, analyses did 
reveal an interaction of trait OM and Facebook post ideology similar to what was found with 
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cognitive receptivity, F(1, 223) = 5.55, p = .019, ηp2 = .02. However, further analyses 
demonstrated that trait OM was only significantly correlated with strong conservative posts 
(r(228) = -.13, p = .043). Thus, higher scores on trait OM were associated with less positive 
affect toward strong conservative posts, but for all other post types there was no relationship 
between positive affect and trait OM.  
As in the case of cognitive receptivity, I conducted four sets of supplemental regression 
analyses on each of the Facebook posts separately. However, these analyses only revealed main 
effects of partisan identity which are conceptually redundant with the implications of the GLM, 
reported above. Notably, none of these regression analyses demonstrated main effects or 
interactions involving trait OM. The regressions results are reported in Table 7 but are not 
expanded upon here.  
4.3.3 Negative Affect  
As with cognitive receptivity, the omnibus GLM (see Table 8) generated a main effect of 
Facebook post extremity, F(1, 223) = 17.55, p < .001, ηp2 = .07. This effect indicated that, on 
average, participants felt more negative affect toward Facebook posts expressing strong (M = 
32.75, SD = 30.13) as opposed to moderate (M = 27.31, SD = 25.25) points of view. I also found 
a significant main effect of Facebook post ideology similar to that found in the analyses of 
cognitive receptivity, F(1, 223) = 6.77, p = .010, ηp2 = .03. This main effect indicated that, on 
average, participants felt more negative affect toward conservative (M = 32.08, SD = 28.05) than 
liberal (M = 27.98, SD = 27.33) Facebook posts. Again, this does not take partisan identity into 
account.  
The two-way interaction between partisan identity and Facebook post extremity was not 
significant, F(1,223) = .55, p = .460, ηp2 = .00. Again, paralleling cognitive receptivity, there was 
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a significant two-way interaction of partisan identity and Facebook post political ideology, F(1, 
223) = 85.79, p < .001, ηp2 = .28. Democrats expressed more negative affect toward conservative 
posts relative to liberal posts (M = 41.67, SD = 28.25 vs. M = 22.13, SD = 24.47), and this 
pattern was reversed for Republicans (M = 22.41, SD = 24.31 vs. M = 33.89 SD = 28.79). There 
was also a significant two-way interaction of Facebook post ideology and post extremity, (F(1, 
223) = 12.87, p < .001, ηp2 = .06. This finding is similar to the two-way interaction found with 
positive affect. This interaction reflected that a similarly high degree of negative affect was 
expressed toward both types of strong Facebook posts (i.e., strong liberal and strong 
conservative) and moderate conservative posts, but there was significantly less negative affect 
reported toward moderate liberal posts (see Figure 6). Again, this interaction does not take 
partisan identity into account and is thus of limited theoretical importance.  
 Analyses revealed the same significant three-way interaction involving partisan identity, 
Facebook post ideology, and Facebook post extremity found in the prior two sets of analyses, 
F(1, 223) = 5.84, p =.016, ηp2 = .03. These findings are presented in Figure 7. Democrats 
expressed less negative affect toward both types of liberal posts with a marked increase for the 
conservative posts (top half ). A similar pattern emerged among Republicans (bottom half). 
These participants expressed a great degree of negative affect toward strong liberal posts which 
then decreased as posts moved along the ideological spectrum from moderate liberal to strong 
conservative.  
Similar to the results with cognitive receptivity, the analyses revealed a marginal main 
effect of trait OM for negative affect, F(1, 223) = 3.18, p = .076, ηp2 = .01. However, there was 
not a significant interaction between trait OM and partisan identity, F(1, 223) = 1.25, p = .264, 
ηp2 = .01. Analyses showed the same interaction of trait OM and Facebook post political 
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ideology that was observed for the prior two dependent variables, F(1, 223) = 6.52, p = .011, ηp2 
= .03. Further tests demonstrated that trait OM was significantly correlated with strong (r(227) = 
-.21, p = .002) and moderate (r(228) = -.14, p = .038) liberal posts (see Table 3), but had no 
significant relationship to either of the conservative posts. Thus, higher scores on trait OM were 
associated with less negative affect toward liberal posts but did not have any relationship to 
negative affect toward conservative posts. Note that these effects are again of limited interest as 
they do not include partisan identity. 
Additional Regression Analyses for Negative Affect. Here again, I ran separate 
regression analyses on each of the four types of Facebook posts (see Table 9). (In this case, 
however, it is worth recalling that the omnibus GLM analyses, reported earlier, showed a 
marginal main effect of trait OM. For this reason, it is useful to report these regression analyses 
in some detail here.) As in the case of cognitive receptivity, each of these analyses entered the 
main effects of trait OM and partisan identity in the first block, with entry of the two-way 
interaction in the second block.  
Strong Liberal Posts. Democrats (vs. Republicans) showed a robust tendency to express 
less negative affect toward the strong liberal posts, b = -.24, t(224) = -3.81, p < .001, CI [-23. 38, 
-7.43]. However, there was a significant main effect of trait OM indicating that participants who 
scored high (vs. low) in trait OM felt less negative affect toward strong liberal posts, b = -.18, 
t(224) = -2.86, p = .005, CI [-10.56, -1.94]. This main effect of trait OM is similar the result 
found with cognitive receptivity. There was no evidence of a two-way interaction, b = .09, t(223) 
= -1.11, p = .270, CI [-3.83, 13.63]. 
Moderate Liberal Posts. As was the case for the strong liberal posts, Democrats 
expressed less negative affect toward these posts compared to Republicans, b = -.14, t(225) = -
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2.18, p = .031, CI [-12.38, .68]. Neither the main effect of trait OM (b = -.12, t(225) = -1.88, p = 
.062, CI [-6.21, .15]) nor the two-way interaction (b = -.15, t(224) = -1.76, p = .080, CI [-12.15, 
.68]) were significant.  
Moderate Conservative Posts. For moderate conservative posts, the only predictor of 
negative affect was partisan identity. Republicans showed less negative affect toward moderate 
conservative posts compared to Democrats, b = .30, t(226) = 4.76, p < .001, CI [9.85, 23.75].  
Strong Conservative Posts. Similar to moderate conservative posts, the only predictor of 
negative affect toward strong conservative posts was partisan identity. Republicans showed less 
negative affect toward strong conservative posts compared to Democrats, b = .39, t(226) = 6.40, 
p < .001, CI [15.51, 29.32].  
4.4 Exploratory Analyses Probing for Additional Moderation Effects Involving Affect  
In the context of the GLMs presented above, I probed for, but failed to find, the presence 
of any interactions involving trait OM and partisan identity for any of the outcome variables. 
Conceptually, these null effects show that trait OM did not moderate the (obviously strong) 
effects of partisan identity when examining participants’ reactions to the Facebook posts. 
In this last section, I report the results of the exploratory analyses testing for the presence 
of a moderated moderation effect involving affect. As was noted in the summary of predictions 
(p. 25), I wished to examine whether the degree to which participants who scored high (vs. low) 
in trait OM are able to maintain a high degree of cognitive receptivity toward outgroup posts 
might depend on their levels of positive or negative affect. This corresponded to the presence of 
a moderated moderation effect involving the interactive effect of three variables: partisan 
identity, trait OM, and affect (see Figure 1 for a conceptual representation of this effect) I tested 
the moderating effects of both types of affect (i.e., positive and negative) separately, and will 
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discuss each in turn. Note that the analyses involving negative affect were formally pre-
registered, however, I did not register the analyses of positive affect.  
I used Model 3 in the PROCESS macro for SPSS to test for the presence of this 
moderated moderation (Hayes, 2017). Although my main interest was in the possible emergence 
of a three-way interaction, this model also tested for all other potential effects involving affect as 
a moderator. For example, these analyses also tested whether negative affect moderated the 
influence of partisan identity, independent of trait OM. (Note, however, that the analyses testing 
the two-way interaction of trait OM and partisan identity are redundant with the GLMs, 
presented earlier.) I ran these analyses separately for each of the four types of Facebook posts.  
Moderation Effects Involving Negative Affect. There was a significant two-way 
interaction of negative affect and partisan identity for cognitive receptivity, but only in the case 
of moderate liberal posts, b = .35, t(222) = 2.28, p = .024, CI [.05, 6.48]). This interaction 
reflected that although Democrats were more receptive to moderate liberal posts compared to 
Republicans, this difference was more pronounced among participants scoring 1 SD above the 
mean in negative affect (see Figure 8). (Here and elsewhere, the division of participants into 
those scoring +/- 1 SD away from the mean is relevant only to the graphing of the results; the 
analyses themselves retained the continuous nature of the variables.) Stated another way, there 
was very little difference in receptivity between Democrats and Republicans who expressed low 
levels of negative affect toward this post. However, among participants who reported feeling a 
great deal of negative affect, Democrats were much more receptive than Republicans. The three-
way interaction of trait OM, partisan identity, and negative affect was not significant for any of 
the Facebook posts.  
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Moderation Effects Involving Positive Affect.  I also ran the same moderated 
moderation analyses using PROCESS to examine all main effects and interactions involving trait 
OM, partisan identity, and positive affect on cognitive receptivity to the four Facebook posts. 
There was a significant two-way interaction of partisan identity and positive affect for the strong 
liberal, moderate liberal, and moderate conservative posts. I will first discuss the interaction for 
the liberal posts (Strong Liberal: b = -.32, t(221) = -2.70, p = .007, CI [-.56, -.09]; Moderate 
Liberal: b = -.20, t(221) = -2.04, p = .043, CI [-.39, -.01]). As displayed in Figure 9a, Democrats 
and Republicans who scored 1 SD above the mean in positive affect expressed roughly 
equivalent receptivity toward the moderate liberal posts. However, among participants who 
scored 1 SD below the mean in positive affect, Democrats were more receptive to moderate 
liberal posts than Republicans. As shown in Figure 9b, a parallel pattern was found for the strong 
liberal posts. 
 In the case of the moderate conservative posts, Democrats and Republicans who scored 1 
SD above the mean in positive affect again showed more receptivity toward the moderate 
conservative posts (see Figure 10). However, among those scoring 1 SD below the mean in 
positive affect, Republicans were more receptive to the moderate conservative posts than 
Democrats (b = .30, t(219) = 2.38, p = .018, CI [.05, .55]). Thus, for all three interactions, 
participants who scored high in positive affect did not display a great deal of partisan bias in 
their receptivity to the posts. In contrast, participants who scored low in positive affect showed 
partisan bias in receptivity to outgroup views.  
There were also two cases in which I observed a two-way interaction of trait OM and 
positive affect on cognitive receptivity. In the case of strong liberal posts, the interaction 
narrowly missed conventional levels of significance, b = -.25, t(221) = -1.97, p = .050, CI [-.49, 
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.00]). As displayed in Figure 11a, this interaction reflected a large main effect of positive affect 
such that those who scored 1 SD above the mean were much more receptive than those scoring 1 
SD below the mean. However, this disparity was greatest for participants who scored low (vs. 
high in trait OM. This same interaction arose for the moderate liberal posts, reflecting that the 
tendency for participants who scored 1 SD above the mean in positive affect to be more receptive 
than those at 1 SD below was less pronounced among those scoring high (vs. low) in trait OM, b 
= -.19, t(221) = -2.55, p = .012, CI [-.33, -.04] (see Figure 11b). As with negative affect, 
however, the three-way interaction between partisan identity, trait OM, and positive affect was 
not significant for any of the Facebook posts. 
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Chapter 5: Study 1 Discussion 
As one might expect, participants’ tendency to accept vs. reject the Facebook posts was 
strongly determined by their partisan identity. For example, Democrats showed a strong 
tendency to accept liberal points of view and reject conservative points of view. The same 
opposite pattern was observed for Republicans. The pattern of results also remained consistent 
for the analyses on positive and negative affect. 
Interestingly—and unexpectedly--the influence of partisan identity, as noted above, was 
not moderated by individual differences in open-mindedness (trait OM). In the case of 
Democrats, for example, this meant that regardless of the participants’ score on trait OM they 
were no more or less likely to be “open” to outgroup views. An analogous pattern arose for 
Republican participants. Among Republicans, those who scored low in trait OM were just as 
unlikely to be “open” to liberal posts as those who scored high. Notably, the absence of any 
moderation effects held regardless of what type of outcome variable was used. Nor did the 
results vary between moderate and extreme points of view. These results make clear that trait 
OM does not moderate partisan bias regardless of whether you measure biased reactions in terms 
of affective reactions or cognitive judgments.  
Taken in isolation, one alternative interpretation of these surprising results is that I was 
not able to properly (or adequately) measure trait OM. However, several aspects of my design 
and results mitigate that interpretation. First, my measure of trait OM was comprised of two 
scales that are psychometrically and conceptually sound. PT in particular is a subscale of a very 
highly cited measure (i.e., the Interpersonal Reactivity Index; Davis, 1983). Equally important, 
results showed that trait OM did play a role in driving some interesting aspects of participants’ 
reactions to the posts. However, these effects always arose independently of partisan identity. 
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 I did find a main effect of trait OM for cognitive receptivity and negative affect. 
However, trait OM never moderated the effects of partisan identity on either outcome variable. I 
also found an interaction of trait OM with Facebook post ideology. Although the precise nature 
of this interaction varied across the three dependent variables, it generally revealed a tendency 
for those scoring high in trait OM to be more open to liberal posts and less open to conservative 
posts. However, this interaction did not take partisan identity into account and is thus of limited 
theoretical interest.  
Aside from the alternative interpretations noted in the preceding section, one could also 
question whether these findings are idiosyncratic to this design or a specific political issue. 
However, these results verify and extend conclusions previously discussed in political 
intolerance literature. In particular, the finding that general endorsements of tolerance do not 
predict specific support for outgroup targets or views (e.g., Gibson, 2011). Thus, this pattern of 
findings is not unrelated to those in the political intolerance literature. A related concern could be 
that these findings are specific to a given political topic. As mentioned in a previous chapter, for 
each type of Facebook post (strong liberal, moderate liberal, strong conservative, moderate 
conservative), I randomized what topic each participant read about. Thus, these findings 
generalize across eight separate political issues.  
An additional finding of interest concerns the lack of order effects. I previously suggested 
that participants who had just rated their trait OM might demonstrate an increased motivation to 
be more open to outgroup views to appear consistent. However, given the lack of any order 
effects, this doesn’t seem to have been the case. By this I mean, even when participants said that 
they were very open-minded right before they reacted to counter-attitudinal views, I still saw no 
reliable effect of trait OM on receptivity to outgroup views.  
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Chapter 6: Study 2 Introduction 
Study 1 demonstrated that the strongest predictor of participants’ reactions to political 
Facebook posts was their partisan identity. More notably, trait OM did not moderate this 
relationship for any of the dependent variables. Thus, participants’ dispositional open-
mindedness never reduced the influence of partisanship on receptivity or affect. In Study 2, I 
measured individual differences in partisan identity and trait OM, as in the first study. However, 
the outcome variables were somewhat different: In Study 2, participants were asked to predict 
how they thought they would respond to a particular political viewpoint. 
Aside from its obvious connections to the affective forecasting literature (see below), this 
approach allowed me additional leverage in understanding some of the surprising results from 
Study 1. In that earlier study, participants who scored high in trait OM showed no signs of 
“setting aside” their own partisan biases when they responded to outgroup political views. In 
Study 2, the direct request for a prediction meant that participants were now forced to explicitly 
consider whether they would be open to others’ viewpoints. Thus, this study tests whether 
participants who just affirmed their high level of open-mindedness would report an intention, at 
least, to be receptive to these kinds of viewpoints.  
On People’s Ability to Assess/Predict Reactions and Affect 
Prior literature on affective and behavioral forecasting provides robust evidence that 
people are not always skilled at predicting how they will feel or act in a future scenario (Gilbert, 
Driver-Linn, & Wilson, 2002; Norris, Dumville, & Lacy, 2011; Sandstrom & Dunn, 2011; 
Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). For example, participants over-estimate how long they will feel 
negative affect after an adverse life (Buehler & McFarland, 2001; Gilbert et al., 1998) and in 
other cases predict they will feel a completely different emotion in a given situation than what 
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they later report (Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001). Studies have also shown that participants are 
not skilled at predicting their future behavior; for example, subjects tend to overestimate the 
likelihood of their own generosity (Epley & Dunning, 2000).  
A recent study by Dorison et al. (2019) demonstrated a general tendency for participants 
to exaggerate the negative affect they would experience when exposed to outgroup political 
views. For example, Clinton voters somewhat over-estimated how negatively watching Trump’s 
inaugural speech would make them feel. Democrats and Republicans also overestimated how 
negatively they would feel while watching speeches by senators from outgroup political parties. 
These forecasting errors were shown to underlie behaviors that reduced exposure to counter-
attitudinal political materials. Notably, these over-estimations were significantly reduced if 
participants read a summary of the research on affective forecasting errors before they made 
predictions about their own emotions.  
This research has important implications for Study 2, as this study aims to determine 
whether participants are adept at predicting how they will react to outgroup political opinions. 
However, in this study participants were only asked to predict these reactions to political views. 
In this sense, participants in Study 2 were asked to play the role of “predictors”, as opposed to 
“experiencers”. This latter role is more applicable to the participants in Study 1 (Blumenthal, 
2005; Gilbert et al., 1998; Gilbert & Ebert, 2002; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003) 1 
 
1 Unlike prior work in the affective forecasting literature, participants were not randomly assigned to the 
experiencers vs. predictors role. Although this is not a major detriment for Study 2, it meant that I could not run a 
single statistical analysis that directly contrasted experiencers vs. predictors. Nevertheless, because I deliberately 
designed Study 2 to be as similar to Study 1 as possible, this did allow me to make reasonable comparisons between 
the two sets of findings. I lay out these comparisons in the General Discussion. 
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Implications and Predictions for the Present Study 
Unlike Study 1, participants in Study 2 were explicitly asked to predict how they would 
respond to a particular set of political statements. The important question at this point is what 
these predictions might look like, and how these might—or might not—match the results I 
obtained in Study 1. It is heuristically useful to address this issue in two parts, first concerning 
partisan identity, and then in terms of trait OM.  
Expected Effects for Partisan Bias 
In Study 1, partisan identity had a very strong effect in terms of how participants actually 
responded to the Facebook posts. In Study 2, I expected that participants would have fairly good 
insight into this process. In other words, when it came to anticipating the role of partisan identity 
in accepting/rejecting opposing political viewpoints, I expected that participants would be 
excellent predictors. For one thing, participants are likely to be very aware of their own partisan 
identity. By this I mean that participants who identified as moderately strong Democrats, for 
example, are aware that they strongly align with this party. It seems likely, too, that participants 
have practical insight into how their partisan identity informs their proclivity to accept vs. reject 
political views. This is to say, I expected strong Democrats, for example, would be very likely to 
predict that they would be more open to liberal vs. conservative points of view.  
 Study 2 used the same, carefully normed set of political views as Study 1. This allowed 
me to examine participants’ predictions not only as a function of the statements ideological slant 
(i.e., whether it was liberal or conservative), but also in terms of whether it represented a 
moderate or extreme point of view. Here again I expected participants to be fairly accurate and 
reveal a pattern closely approximating what I found in Study 1. For example, when Democrats 
were asked to predict their cognitive receptivity, they should generate predictions suggesting (a) 
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fairly high receptivity to the two liberal statements, regardless of whether they were strong or 
moderate, and (b) far less receptivity to the conservative statements, especially for the extreme 
conservative statement. I expected a conceptually analogous pattern to arise from the 
Republicans. Based on the results of Study 1, I had no reason to suspect that participants would 
be any less accurate in formulating predictions about their affective reactions. All in all, then, the 
predictions made by participants in Study 2 were expected to closely match the data from Study 
1, at least with respect to the dynamics associated with partisan identity.  
Expected Effects for Trait OM 
Far more interesting for my purposes was whether participants’ predictions would match 
the pattern obtained in Study 1 with respect to trait OM. In broaching this issue, it is useful to 
keep in mind two (related) aspects of the way that I measured trait OM. First, the measures, 
themselves, were relatively transparent. By that I mean, participants were likely to be well aware 
that we were measuring their beliefs about being open (or closed) minded. Second, participants 
were likely to have good “meta-awareness” in terms of how they were answering the questions 
and whether they were scoring relatively high or low on the scale. Thus, in some sense, this 
measure was likey to capture what might be characterized as a set of schematic beliefs about 
their personal qualities. Here I do not suggest that these beliefs about the self are necessarily 
false. Rather, my point is that the psychological function of these beliefs may not be dissimilar to 
that of other highly schematized views.  
I raise these issues here because they are potentially relevant to the affective forecasting 
literature. In particular, research in this areas often assumes that errors are attributable to the 
influence of pre-stored, highly schematized beliefs about the self and others (see Gilbert et al., 
1998). In this context, therefore, my point is that participants’ predictions as to how they are 
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likely to react may draw, at least in part, on their pre-stored beliefs about the self (e.g., “I am the 
type of person who tends to be open”). 
These considerations set up an expectation that sharply contrasts with results obtained in 
Study 1. Recall that in the first study, participants were just as likely to show partisan bias, 
regardless of whether they scored high or low in trait OM. I expected something quite different 
in Study 2. I hypothesized that participants who scored high (vs. low) trait OM would use this 
belief in their open-mindedness to generate a prediction that they would be more open to 
moderate outgroup views. Thus, the tendency for Republicans to predict they would be less 
receptive to moderate liberal views should be attenuated among participants who scored high vs. 
low in trait OM. Similarly, the tendency for Democrats to predict they would be less receptive to 
moderate conservative views should be lessened among participants who scored high vs. low in 
trait OM. Statistically, this corresponds to a four-way interaction of partisan identity, trait OM, 
statement extremity and statement ideology. 
My hypotheses for the affective outcome variables were similar. I expected that 
participants who score high (vs. low) in trait OM to use this belief in their open-mindedness to 
generate a prediction that they would feel less negatively (and more positively) toward outgroup 
political views. For example, Democrats who scored high in trait OM would predict they would 
feel less negatively (and more positively) toward moderately conservative views relative to the 
predictions made by of those scoring low in trait OM. I expect the opposite pattern for 
Republicans. Thus, I am again hypothesizing a four-way interaction of trait OM, partisan 
identity, statement ideology, and statement extremity.  
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Chapter 7: Study 2 Methods 
7.1 Participants  
I intended to collect a sample of 230 participants (115 Democrats and 115 Republicans) 
on Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mturk). Recall that I had significant difficultly recruiting 
“Extremely Strong Republicans” in Study 1. In Study 1, there were no theoretically important 
differences between participants who rated themselves as extremely or moderately strong 
partisans in either party. Thus, to avoid my previous sampling difficulties, I only recruited 
participants who rated themselves as “Moderately Strong” Democrats or Republicans in Study 2.  
In order to account for the expected 15% exclusion rate, I initially recruited 264 
participants. Yet again I experienced an unexpectedly high rate of “farmers” and “repeaters” 
among the Moderately Strong Republicans. As such, it was necessary to collect data from 278 
participants to obtain the necessary sample. In total, 49 participants were excluded from analyses 
in accordance with the criteria laid out in Appendix F. The final sample was comprised of 229 
participants (67% female and 77% white). After several reposts of the study, I was only able to 
recruit 108 Moderately Strong Republicans. In order to satisfy the power analyses, it was 
necessary to expand the sample of Moderately Strong Democrats to 121 participants (see 
Appendix M for details on selection procedures). This imbalance was not of great theoretical 
concern as the results in Study 1 were consistent across partisan identities.  
7.2 Overview of Procedure 
In Study 2, participants imagined how they thought they would react to a set of political 
views, rather than reading and reacting to fictional Facebook posts (see Appendix N for 
schematic representation of study design). Thus, participants were asked to predict their reactions 
to political views, rather than actually react to them. Aside from this, the design of Study 2 was 
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identical to the first study. I used the same text from the Facebook posts in Study 1, however in 
this case the materials were presented as hypothetical opinions a person could express not as 
social media posts. I edited the dependent variables to reflect this change (see below). I also 
removed the two questions about social media. All other questions, blocks, and randomization 
procedures were identical to Study 1.  
7.3 Measures 
 Trait OM was measured in the same manner as Study 1 (i.e., mean of standardized PT 
and OMC scales; α = .88). Partisan identity was also measured in the same manner (i.e., single 
item in the pre-screen). However, in this case, I only accepted participants who identified 
themselves as “Moderately Strong” Republicans and Democrats. For simplicity, I will refer to 
participants as Democrats and Republicans.  
Predicted Reaction Block  
In this section participants read an initial set of instructions that were as follows: 
“Imagine how you might react to various points of view. You will read a description of a 
hypothetical point of view (e.g., "Imagine a conversation in which someone is telling you that 
they believe public school teachers should make more money.”) and describe how you might 
react or feel.” Following this, participants were randomly assigned to read four types of 
statements corresponding with the same four levels of ideology and extremity used in Study 1 
(i.e., strong liberal, moderate liberal, moderate conservative, and strong conservative).  
As in Study 1, within each of the four statement categories, I used two statements arguing 
for two distinct points of view that were matched in their ideology and extremity. The statements 
used the same text as the Facebook posts, but in this case they were displayed as quotes rather 
than social media posts (see Appendix O for full text). Participants were randomly assigned to 
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view only one statement in each ideological category. Thus, participants read four statements 
total, one in each ideology and extremity category, and within each category participants were 
randomly assigned to see one topic out of two possibilities. The study was completely 
randomized to ensure that equal numbers of Republicans and Democrats saw each point of view 
at each ideological level.  
Dependent Variables. Participants rated each statement across a randomized set of 14 
questions (see Appendix P for full question text). Six of the questions measured participants’ 
predicted receptivity, and the other eight measured predicted affective reactions to the 
statements. 
Predicted Receptivity. First, on a scale from 0 (Not at all) to 100 (Very much so) 
participants rated how they thought they would judge the statements across the following 
domains: persuasive, logical, and well-reasoned. Using the same 0 to 100 scale, participants 
rated how open-minded they thought they would be to the opinions in the statements. 
Participants rated how willing they thought they would be to have a follow-up conversation with 
the person expressing each point of view on the scale from 0 to 100. I formed an index of 
predicted receptivity by taking the overall mean of these five items (mean α = .89).  
As in Study 1, there was a final item that asked how strongly participants thought they 
would agree with this point of view. This item was not included in the composite measure as it 
was answered on a different scale (i.e., 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)).  
Predicted Affective Reactions. Using a scale ranging from 0 (Not at all) to 100 (Very 
much so) participants rated how they thought discussing the point of view in each of the 
statements would make them feel. Predicted affect was measured across the same set of eight 
randomized items as in Study 1: happy, excited, angry, frustrated, content, annoyed, disgusted, 
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and proud. I formed the same indices of positive and negative affect (mean Negative α = .92; 
mean Positive α = .89).  
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Chapter 8: Study 2 Results 
8.1 Preliminary Analyses of Study 2 
 Prior to reporting formal analyses for Study 2, I again consider some preliminary matters 
that are relevant to the main analyses presented ahead.  
Validity of Partisan Identity Measure 
 Here again, I operationalized partisan identity with two levels, Moderately Strong 
Democrats and Republicans. I tested participants’ scores on the RWA and SDO scales to verify 
that the single-item measure was valid. Republicans scored far higher on RWA than Democrats, 
F(1,227) = 214.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .49 (M = 4.10, SD = .88 vs. M = 2.40, SD = .88). Republicans 
also scored higher on SDO than Democrats, F(1,227) = 193.06, p < .001, ηp2 =.46 (M = 3.53, SD 
= .91 vs. M = 1.98, SD = .77). These findings validate my assumption that the partisan identity 
groups represent two groups of people who differ in their ideological beliefs.  
Check for Order Effects 
As in Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to either complete the individual 
difference or the statement block first. Thus, it is was again necessary to check for order effects. 
An initial set of ANOVAs revealed one effect of order for the dependent variable that measured 
predicted positive reactions to strong liberal statements (see Table 10). Further analyses 
indicated that the results did not change in any meaningful way when I used the residualized 
version of this variable. As this order effect only arose for one variable, and given that the results 
did not change, I continued the analyses below using the un-residualized variable.  
8.2 Correlational Analyses 
Table 11 presents the means and standard deviations of all the dependent variables. 
Tables 12 present the correlations between the dependent variables separately for the four 
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statement types. As in Study 1, the correlations between these variables were not strong enough 
to suggest that the outcomes variables were interchangeable or that they should be analyzed 
together.  
8.3 Main Analyses 
 I again used the multivariate general linear model (GLM) option in SPSS to test the 
predicted main effects and interactions of (a) two between-subjects factors (partisan identity and 
trait OM) and (b) two within-subjects factors (statement ideology and extremity). I will report 
the results of the omnibus models using the same approach as Study 1. For each of the outcome 
variables, I begin by noting the presence of any significant main effects and interactions, 
temporarily collapsing over trait OM. After reporting these initial effects, I then consider the 
effects involving trait OM. Beyond these parallels to Study 1, however, it is important to keep in 
mind that the outcome variables are different in the case of Study 2. In this latter study, I 
explicitly asked participants to predict how they would respond to the statements in question.  
8.3.1 Predicted Cognitive Receptivity  
The omnibus GLM analysis (see Table 13) generated a main effect of statement 
extremity, F(1, 225) = 13.39, p = .001, ηp2 = .06. This effect indicated that, on average, 
participants predicted they would be more receptive to statements expressing moderate (M = 
61.38, SD = 23.48) as opposed to extreme (M = 56.66, SD = 25.74) points of view. There was 
also a significant main effect of statement ideology, F(1, 225) = 15.23, p < .001, ηp2 = .06. This 
main effect indicated that, on average, participants predicted they would be more receptive to 
liberal (M = 62.54, SD = 24.72) than conservative (M = 55.50, SD = 24.49) statements. This 
effect is again not of great importance as it collapses over partisan identity.  
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The two-way interaction between partisan identity and statement extremity was not 
significant, F(1,225) = .13, p = .721, ηp2 = .00. This null effect was expected, as it collapses over 
whether the statements themselves represented liberal or conservative points of view. There was 
a significant two-way interaction of partisan identity and statement political ideology, F(1, 225) 
= 230.42, p < .001, ηp2 = .51. As seen in Figure 12, Democrats predicted they would be more 
receptive to liberal compared to conservative statements (M = 72.81, SD = 19.17 vs. M = 44.41, 
SD = 23.19), and this pattern was reversed for Republicans (M = 51.01 SD = 24.09 vs. M = 
67.92, SD = 18.67). As in the prior study, this analysis serves as both a manipulation check and a 
confirmation of my hypothesis that participants would predict they would be more receptive to 
points of view that expressed ingroup views.   
Of greater interest, the analyses revealed a significant three-way interaction involving 
partisan identity, statement ideology, and extremity, F(1, 225) = 26.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .11. These 
findings are presented in Figure 13. Democrats made approximately equal predictions about their 
receptivity to both types of liberal statements (top half). Their predictions significantly decreased 
for both conservative statements and were lowest for strong conservative views. Next consider 
the Republican participants (bottom half). Republicans predicted they would be least receptive to 
strong liberal statements (left), their predicted receptivity slightly increased for moderate liberal 
statements. Republicans made equally high predictions about their receptivity to conservative 
statements. This pattern of results is very similar to those obtained in Study 1.  
The next set of analyses provide leverage on the question: To what extent, if any, would 
trait OM moderate partisan bias in predictions about receptivity to counter-attitudinal points of 
view? The analyses revealed a pattern that was remarkably similar to Study 1, indicating that 
higher scores on trait OM were associated with a general tendency to predict greater receptivity 
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to all of the statements, F(1, 225) = 11.34, p = .001, ηp2 = .05. Correlational analyses 
demonstrated that trait OM was positively correlated with predicted receptivity for the extreme 
(r(229) = .25 p = .003) as well as moderate (r(229) = .218 p < .001) liberal statements. For the 
conservative statements, the relationship between trait OM and receptivity was not statistically 
significant for the extreme (r(229) = -.07, p = .294) or moderate (r(229) = .08, p = .232) 
statements.  
As in Study 1, however, these effects are not qualified by partisan identity, as the two-
way interaction with trait OM was not significant, F(1,225 ) = .41, p = .522, ηp2 = .00. Indeed, 
once again there was not a single instance in which trait OM significantly interacted with the 
partisan identity. Thus, the effects of trait OM operated independently of participants’ political 
views. In all, these analyses demonstrated that, as in Study 1, trait OM did not moderate the 
tendency for partisan identity to limit predicted receptivity to outgroup views.  
Additional Regression Analyses for Predicted Cognitive Receptivity. As in Study 1, I 
conducted follow up regression analyses to further examine the observed main effect of trait OM 
for each of the statements separately. As I show below, these analyses demonstrated a strong 
effect of partisan identity, but there was no indication that these effects were moderated by trait 
OM (see Table 14).  
Strong Liberal Statements. For these statements, Democrats showed a robust tendency to 
predict they would be more receptive to the strong liberal statements relative to Republicans, b = 
.50, t(226) = 8.54, p < .001, CI [20. 17, 32.28]. There was also a significant main effect of trait 
OM, b = .12, t(226) = 2.01, p = .045, CI [. 07, 6.53]. This main effect indicated that, independent 
of partisan identity, participants who scored high (vs. low) in trait OM predicted they would be 
73 
more receptive to strong liberal statements. However, there was no two-way interaction, b = .02, 
t(225) = .30, p = .767, CI [-5.55, 7.51].  
Moderate Liberal Statements. As was the case for the strong liberal statements, 
Democrats predicted that they would be more receptive to these views compared to Republicans, 
b = .32, t(226) = 4.90, p < .001, CI [8.74, 20.47]. Once more there was no evidence of a main 
effect of trait OM, b = .09, t(226) = 1.39, p =.167, CI [-.93, 5.33], nor of an interaction, b = .01, 
t(225) = .10, p = .923, CI [-6.02, 6.64].  
Moderate Conservative Statements. For these statements, Republicans predicted they 
would be more receptive to the moderate conservative statements relative to Democrats, b = -.39, 
t(226) = -6.13, p < .001, CI [-24.71, -12.69]. There was a significant main effect of trait OM, b = 
.19, t(226) = 2.91, p = .004, CI [1. 52, 7.94]. This main effect demonstrated that participants who 
scored high (vs. low) in trait OM predicted that they would be more receptive to moderate 
conservative statements. However, there was no evidence that this pattern was moderated by trait 
OM, b = .06, t(225) = .74, p = .459, CI [-4.04, 8.92].  
Strong Conservative Statements. Similar to moderate conservative statements, 
Republicans predicted they would be more receptive to the strong conservative views relative to 
Democrats, b =- .64, t(226) = -11.86, p < .001, CI [-37.50, -26.81]. Neither the main effect of 
trait OM (b = .11, t(226) = 1.93, p = .055, CI [-.06, 5.65]) nor the two-way interaction (b = .03, 
t(225) = .47, p = .643, CI [-4.40, 7.12]) were significant. 
8.3.2. Predicted Positive Affect  
I use the same approach to examine the dependent variables concerning predicted 
positive affect. The omnibus GLM (see Table 15) indicated that there was no main effect of 
statement extremity, F(1, 225) = .08, p = .783, ηp2 = .00. There was a significant main effect of 
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statement ideology (F(1, 225) = 20.00, p < .001, ηp2 = .08). This main effect indicated that, on 
average, participants predicted they would feel more positive affect in response to liberal (M = 
36.28, SD = 27.65) as compared to conservative (M = 28.02, SD = 25.66) statements.  
The two-way interaction between partisan identity and statement extremity was not 
significant, F(1,225) = 1.26, p = .263, ηp2 = .01. There was a significant two-way interaction of 
partisan identity and statement ideology, F(1, 225) = 117.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .34. This interaction 
indicated that Democrats predicted they would feel more positive affect toward liberal compared 
to conservative statements (M = 41.78, SD = 29.18 vs. M = 17.36, SD = 20.64), and this pattern 
was reversed for Republicans (M = 30.12 SD = 24.941 vs. M = 39.98, SD = 25.30).  
Analyses also revealed a significant three-way interaction of partisan identity, statement 
ideology, and extremity, F(1, 225) = 13.29, p < .001, ηp2 = .06. These findings are presented in 
Figure 14. Democrats (top half) predicted they would feel approximately equal positive affect 
toward liberal statements. There was a pronounced decline for the conservative statements. 
Republicans predicted they would feel the least positive affect for strong liberal statements 
(bottom half). Their predicted positive affect gradually increased as the statements moved from 
moderate liberal to strong conservative. This pattern of results mirrors those found for predicted 
cognitive receptivity and what I found for experienced positive affect in Study 1.  
The analyses did not reveal a main effect of trait OM for predicted positive affect (F(1, 
223) = 1.87, p = .173, ηp2 = .01), nor was there an interaction with partisan identity (F(1, 223) = 
.87, p = .353, ηp2 = .00). Thus, participants who scored high (vs. low) in trait OM were not more 
likely to predict they would feel positive affect toward ingroup or outgroup statements. This is 
the same result that was obtained for positive affect in Study 1. Once again, these analyses 
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demonstrated that, trait OM did not influence the tendency for partisan identity to limit predicted 
positive affect to outgroup views.  
Additional Regression Analyses for Predicted Positive Affect. Again, I examined 
separate regression analyses for each of the statements. These analyses are of limited interest, as 
the GLM revealed no main effect or interaction involving trait OM. Consistent with the results of 
Study 1, each of the regression analyses also demonstrated a strong effect of partisan identity, 
but no main effects or interactions involving trait OM. These regressions results are reported in 
Table 16 but are not expanded upon in text.  
8.3.3 Predicted Negative Affect  
The omnibus GLM (see Table 17) showed a main effect of statement extremity, F(1, 225) 
= 12.67, p = .001, ηp2 = .05. This effect indicated that, on average, participants predicted they 
would feel more negative affect toward extreme (M = 38.66, SD = 29.22) as opposed to moderate 
(M = 32.74, SD = 26.18) points of view. There was also a significant main effect of statement 
ideology, F(1, 225) = 8.52, p = .004, ηp2 = .04. This main effect indicated that, on average, 
participants predicted they would feel more negative affect toward conservative (M = 38.87, SD 
= 27.31) than liberal (M = 35.52, SD = 28.09) statements. Again, this does not take partisan 
identity into account.  
The two-way interaction between partisan identity and statement extremity was not 
significant, F(1,225) = .17, p = .679, ηp2 = .00. There was a significant two-way interaction of 
partisan identity and statement ideology, F(1, 225) = 98.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .31. This interaction 
indicated that Democrats predicted they would feel more negative affect toward conservative 
relative to liberal statements (M = 44.39, SD = 27.45 vs. M = 22.35, SD = 23.56), and this pattern 
was reversed for Republicans (M = 32.68, SD = 25.71 vs. M = 42.80 SD = 29.09). There was also 
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a significant two-way interaction of statement ideology and extremity, (F(1, 225) = 5.60, p = 
.019, ηp2 = .02 (see Figure 15). This interaction reflected that participants predicted they would 
feel more negative affect toward conservative, relative to liberal, statements, and toward 
extreme, relative to moderate, statements.  
 Analyses revealed a significant three-way interaction of partisan identity, statement 
ideology, and statement extremity, F(1, 225) = 18.79, p < .001, ηp2 = .08. As seen in Figure 16, 
Democrats predicted they would feel approximately equal levels of negative affect toward liberal 
statements (top half). This prediction greatly increased for moderate and strong conservative 
statements. Republicans predicted they would feel similar levels of negative affect toward 
moderate liberal, moderate conservative, and strong conservative statements (bottom half). They 
predicted they would feel significantly more negative affect toward strong liberal statements. 
Again, this pattern of results is nearly identical to those obtained in Study 1.  
Similar to Study 1, the analyses revealed a significant main effect of trait OM for 
negative affect, F(1, 225) = 5.74, p = .018, ηp2 = .03. This effect indicates that participants who 
scored high (vs. low) in trait OM tended to predict they would feel less negative affect toward 
the statements, in general. However, there was no significant interaction between trait OM and 
partisan identity, F(1, 225) = .43, p = .511, ηp2 = .00.  
The analyses also showed a significant three-way interaction of trait OM, partisan 
identity, statement extremity, F(1, 225) = 4.21, p = .041, ηp2 = .02). I decomposed the interaction 
to better understand this result and tested a unique model for each level of statement extremity. 
Thus, I ran two general linear models with two between-subjects factors (partisan identity and 
trait OM) and one within-subjects factor (statement ideology). However, the interaction between 
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trait OM and partisan identity was not significant for moderate (F(1, 225) = 2.53, p =.113, ηp2 = 
.01) or strong statements, (F(1, 225) = .18, p =.676, ηp2 = .00).  
Additional Regression Analyses for Predicted Negative Affect. Here again, I ran 
separate regression analyses (see Table 18) on each of the four types of statements to better 
understand the main effect of trait OM seen in the preceding GLM.  
Strong Liberal Statements. Democrats predicted they would feel less negative affect 
toward the strong liberal statements, b = -.40, t(226) = -6.34, p < .001, CI [-31. 52, -16.57]. There 
was not main effect (b = -.07, t(226) = -1.06, p = .290, CI [-6. 14, 1.84]) or an interaction (b = -
.06, t(225) = -.76, p = .449, CI [-11. 16, 4.96]) involving trait OM.  
Moderate Liberal Statements. Here again, Democrats predicted they would feel less 
negative affect toward moderate liberal statements compared to Republicans, b = -.24, t(226) = -
3.58, p < .001, CI [-19.04, -5.51]. Neither the main effect of trait OM, (b = -.11, t(226) = -1.59, p 
= .112, CI [-6.53, .69]), nor the two-way interaction (b = -.16, t(225) = -1.85, p = .066, CI [-
14.04, .45]) were significant.  
Moderate Conservative Statements. For these statements, the was a significant main 
effect of partisan identity indicating that Republicans predicted they would feel less negative 
affect toward moderate conservative views compared to Democrats, b = .17, t(226) = 2.49, p = 
.031, CI [1.87, 16.03]. The was no main effect of trait OM, (b = -.13, t(226) = -1.89, p = .060, CI 
[-7.40, .16]), nor was there a significant two-way interaction (b = -.08, t(225) = -.88, p = .380, CI 
[-11.03, .4.22])  
Strong Conservative Statements. Similarly, Republicans predicted they would feel less 
negative affect toward strong conservative views compared to Democrats, b = .33, t(226) = -
5.03, p < .001, CI [11.28, 25.80]. In this case, there was a significant main effect of trait OM, b = 
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-.15, t(226) = -2.22, p = .027, CI [-8. 25, -.50]. This effect indicated that participants who scored 
high (vs. low) in trait OM predicted that they would feel less negative affect toward strong 
conservative statements,  
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Chapter 9: Study 2 Discussion 
In contrast to Study 1, Study 2 was oriented toward understanding how participants 
would predict their reactions to the counter-attitudinal political views. As I anticipated, one 
aspect of these predictions closely matched the results of Study 1. In particular, participants 
reliably predicted they would be most open to statements that were consistent with their partisan 
identity and reject those that were not. This was also true for the outcome variables concerning 
affect.  
Results did not, however, support my predictions with respect to trait OM. In the case of 
participants’ who scored high in trait OM, I expected to see a kind of “benign self-schema” 
emerge, in the sense that they would expect themselves to be relatively free of partisan bias. For 
example, I expected the Democrats who scored themselves high (vs. low) in trait OM to strongly 
predict they would be open to conservative views.  
However, the results did not confirm this hypothesis. Just as in Study 1, there was a main 
effect of open-mindedness indicating that participants who scored high (vs. low) in trait OM 
predicted they would be more receptive to all of the statements, in general. But trait OM never 
moderated the effects of partisan identity. In a sense, therefore, I found that participants were 
remarkably accurate in their predictions about trait OM, in that these predictions matched what 
happened in Study 1. Participants who rated themselves as highly open-minded were no more 
likely to predict they would be open to outgroup views than those who scored low in trait OM. 
Thus, in contrast to the prediction I made above, Democrats who scored themselves high (vs. 
low) in trait OM did not predict they would be more open to conservative views.  
The absence of any moderation effects held regardless of what type of outcome variable 
was used (i.e., predicted cognitive or predicted affective reactions). This means that participants 
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who scored high in trait OM were not any more likely to predict they would feel positively or 
negatively about outgroup views than those who scored low in open-mindedness. For example, 
high trait OM Republicans did not predict they would feel more positive affect toward liberal 
views than Republicans who scored low in trait OM. Similarly, Republicans who scored high 
(vs. low) in trait OM were not more likely to predict they would feel less negative affect toward 
liberal views.  
This pattern of findings, although unexpected, is very interesting. This study indicates 
that subjects appear to have very good insight into the limitations of trait OM in moderating 
partisan bias. This suggests that, at least in the domain of politics, participants are fairly adept at 
predicting how they will feel about and react to outgroup views. I will discuss the implications of 
these findings in greater detail in the section to follow.  
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Chapter 10: General Discussion 
General Summary  
A major goal of this dissertation was to determine whether dispositional open-
mindedness (i.e., trait OM) actually predicted more “open” reactions to outgroup political views. 
A key prediction was that participants’ tendencies to reject such views would be moderated by 
trait OM. For example, I predicted that Democrats would be more open to conservative points of 
view if they scored relatively high (vs. low) in trait OM. I tested this and other related 
propositions in the context of two paradigms. Study 1 measured participants’ actual reactions to 
such views. In contrast, Study 2 asked participants to predict how they thought they would 
respond to these opinions.  
However, my predictions about trait OM were not supported by the data in either study. 
Across both studies and all outcome variables, the single most consistent and powerful predictor 
of “open” reactions was partisan identity. In particular, the nature of participants’ cognitive 
receptivity to these posts (as well as their affective reactions) was dictated by the “match” 
between their partisan identity and the type of viewpoint represented by that post. With respect to 
trait OM, however, the results of the two studies were remarkably consistent: I did not find a 
single instance, in either study, in which trait OM moderated the impact of partisan identity. I 
discuss these parallels in more detail below.  
A Closer Look at the Parallelism from Studies 1 and 2 
In combination, the two studies reported in this dissertation bear on the psychological 
dynamics of what the researchers in the affective forecasting literature refer to as “experiencers” 
(Study 1) and “predictors” (Study 2). Unlike other studies in this area (e.g., Gilbert et al., 1998), I 
did not randomly assign participants to these roles. There were also some differences in the exact 
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way that I operationalized partisan identity between the two studies. For these reasons, there are 
limitations in the extent to which I could conduct formal statistical comparisons across the two 
studies.  
Keeping this caveat in mind, it is heuristically useful to make some informal comparisons 
across these data sets. Such comparisons more vividly illustrate just how similar the results of the 
studies really were. For example, consider cognitive receptivity. In Table 19, I display the 
relevant means for this outcome variable as a function of the major variables in my design 
(Facebook post/statement type, type of outcome variable, partisan identity) for both Study 2 (top 
row) as well as Study 1 (bottom row).1 To be sure, there were a few variations across the two 
studies. However, the more remarkable implication is how similar the results were for all three 
outcome variables. For example, Democratic “predictors” expected they would score a 37.83 on 
receptivity to strong conservative views, and Democratic “experiencers” scored 31.13. As 
another example, Republican “predictors” expected they would score a 46.89 on negative affect 
toward strong liberal posts, and the Republican “experiencers” scored a 41.83.  
Nevertheless, one slight difference is worth noting. In particular, the “predictors” in 
Study 2 tended to overestimate the valence of their reactions relative to what was reported by the 
“experiencers” in Study 1. On average, participants overestimated receptiveness by a modest 
degree, 10.09 points (out of 100). The difference scores for affect were similar, with Republicans 
overestimating positive and negative affect to a greater degree than Democrats. These results 
make clear that, at least in the domain of politics, participants are surprisingly aware of how 
 
1 By putting the means from Study 2 first, this table reverses the chronological order in which the two studies were 
conducted, but in this context, it is more useful to first consider participants’ predictions.  
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powerful partisan identity is in influencing reactions to outgroup views, regardless of how open-
minded they perceive themselves to be.  
The tendency for the “predictors” to overestimate affective reactions relative to the 
“experiencers” is fairly similar to results found by Dorison et al. (2019). The authors found a 
tendency for partisans (in this case, Clinton and Trump supporters) to over-estimate the negative 
affect they would experience as a result of contact with outgroup views (i.e., Trump’s inaugural 
speech, speech by opposing party senator). Across five studies, they asked participants to rate 
how they would feel watching videos of or reading material about outgroup (vs. ingroup) 
political figures (e.g., Donald Trump and Barack Obama). These same participants later rated 
their actual affective reactions after exposure to these materials. The results indicated that 
participants overestimated the degree of negative affect they would experience. This dissertation 
demonstrated a similar tendency to over-estimate negative affect (albeit not within the same 
participants) and shows a similar tendency to over-estimate positive affect.  
Addressing Some Alternative Explanations 
Prior to considering the implications of these findings for the broader psychological and 
political science literatures, I will first discuss a few potential alternative explanations.  
Trait OM Operationalization  
As I noted in the discussion of Study 1, one could question whether I adequately 
operationalized trait OM. However, there are compelling reasons to believe that my measure of 
trait OM was methodologically sound. First, the personality measures that were used to construct 
the trait OM variable (PT and OMC) are well-validated and psychometrically sound. The paper 
in which the PT subscale was proposed has been cited more than 8,000 times on Google Scholar. 
Given that PT has a much longer history than OMC, there is a larger amount of research to 
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establish this scale’s validity. As was mentioned in the introduction, past research has 
demonstrated that higher PT is associated with lower stereotyping/prejudice (Ku, Wang, & 
Galinsky, 2010), greater satisfaction in romantic relationships (Franzoi, Davis, Young, & 
Richard 1985), and reduced anger in response to interpersonal conflict (Mohr et al., 2007). 
However, the two scales are highly correlated (see earlier discussion on p.5) and demonstrated a 
high degree of internal reliability (see p. 39 and p. 66). Hence, there is no evidence that the trait 
OM measure was “weak” or lacking in terms of my ability to capture the underlying construct.  
Second, in both studies I found main effects of trait OM, indicating that those who scored 
high on this variable were generally more open to the points of view tested. This finding 
validates that trait OM did, in fact, capture the tendency to be more open-minded on average. 
Thus, it seems unlikely that the results of this dissertation could be attributed to the way that I 
operationalized trait OM. My results could, however, highlight the need to measure open-
mindedness in a more contextualized manner in order to improve predictive validity. I shall 
return to this line of reasoning in my discussion of the literature on Frame of Reference effects.  
Partisan Identity Operationalization  
It seems even less likely that the present results could be attributed to problems with the 
way that I operationalized partisan identity. In both studies, I found statistically significant and 
rather large (in terms of effect size) effects involving partisan identity. The results were highly 
significant for each of the different types of outcome variables (i.e., receptivity, affect) and were 
consistent with my predictions. Moreover, supplemental analyses with RWA and SDO also 
validated the meaningfulness of this variable. I could indeed have operationalized the political 
views of the participants in a number of different ways. For example, I could have used a 
continuous measure of political ideology (i.e., bipolar scale of liberalism vs. conservatism; Jost, 
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2006). However, using the current measure of partisan identity my predictions were not only 
confirmed, but the effect sizes for these findings were quite robust. In combination, these 
considerations provide compelling evidence that the approach I used to measure partisan identity 
effectively captured the construct.  
Statistical Power/Sample Size 
One could also question whether I had adequate statistical power to detect the effects of 
trait OM and any interaction with partisan identity. As I noted in an earlier section of this 
dissertation (see p. 34), I ran into some unexpected difficulties when recruiting strong 
Republicans in both studies, but particularly in the case of Extremely Strong Republicans in 
Study 1. As was outlined in the methods sections and elaborated upon in the appendices, I 
gathered the maximum number of strong Republicans possible on Mturk. Each study was posted 
multiple times over several weeks, and with each repost there were clear diminishing returns in 
terms of the balance of good subjects to “farmers”. This necessarily imposed some limits on the 
sample sizes that I was able to collect. This concern should not be completely dismissed, of 
course. However, any concerns along these lines are less serious than they might otherwise be, 
given the remarkably parallel pattern of results obtained across two independent samples in the 
context of Study 1 and Study 2.  
Another consideration is worth noting as well. Suppose that both studies had generated 
weak evidence of a trait OM moderation effect that did not reach conventional levels of 
statistical significance. Such a pattern would, of course, raise serious concerns about insufficient 
power to detect a hypothesized effect. However, this is not what happened. Neither study showed 
any reliable evidence of such moderation effects in the first place. For this reason alone, the 
problem of “insufficient power” does not appear to be greatly concerning, at least as it bears on 
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the role of trait OM as a moderator. Stated differently, it seems unlikely that I would have 
obtained any evidence of such moderation, even if I had recruited a sample double or even triple 
the size used in this dissertation.  
Operationalization of Cognitive Receptivity  
 A final consideration bears on the way that I operationalized participants’ cognitive 
receptivity. One might argue that I could have taken alternate paths in operationalizing this 
variable. However, in both studies I found a reliable main effect of trait OM indicating that those 
who scored high in this trait also typically scored high in receptivity to the Facebook posts and 
statements. This variable also had high internal reliability in both studies (α = .91 and .89). Thus, 
the specific items I used “hung together” well and they appear to have captured the intended 
construct. Given these results, I would argue that this variable was adequately specified.  
There are certainly different approaches to measuring receptivity that would be 
interesting. For example, in a future study I would like to ask participants to write a 5-6 sentence 
response to an outgroup political Facebook post. This data could then be subjected to qualitative 
analyses in LIWC (Pennebaker et al., 2015). However, this approach would not have worked in 
the context of this dissertation. In my experience, the quality of written responses from Mturk 
workers declines if multiple writing tasks are assigned. This is also confirmed by formal research 
on Mturk data quality (see Lovett et al., 2017). Thus, I did not think asking participants to write a 
paragraph response to four Facebook posts was the best path in this dissertation. Other 
interesting approaches would have been to measure reaction times or facial expressions. Here 
again, this would only be possible in a completely new paradigm. These are approaches I would 
like to explore in future research (see below), however, in the context of the present dissertation I 
believe my operationalization of receptivity was sound.  
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Broader Implications and Future Directions  
Having addressed these alternative explanations, I will now review the ramifications of 
these findings to several literatures. As discussed in prior sections, the implications of this 
dissertation are particularly relevant to research on political intolerance, the predictive validity of 
trait OM, frame of reference effects, the role of affect in open-mindedness, and affective 
forecasting. I will discuss each in turn.  
Political Intolerance  
The political intolerance literature provides robust evidence that abstract endorsements of 
tolerance do not reliably predict tolerant reactions to specific groups or perspectives running 
counter to the self (Gibson 2013; Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan, Pierson, & Marcus, 1979). My 
research both confirms and extends this pattern of findings. First, this dissertation confirms that 
general endorsements of open-mindedness do not necessarily predict open-minded reactions to 
specific outgroup views. However, my research also greatly extends this work by using an 
individual difference measure to examine personal openness to outgroup political views.  
Within the political intolerance literature, researchers commonly ask detailed questions 
about participants’ political attitudes (i.e., personal political ideology), their general support for 
political tolerance (e.g., “I believe everyone should have free speech”), before measuring their 
support for tolerance for particular groups (e.g., “I believe communists should have free 
speech.”) (e.g., Gibson & Bingham, 1983; Kuklinksi et al., 1991; McClosky & Brill, 1983). It is 
important to remember, however, that the focus of political tolerance measures is whether a 
participant believes the state should show tolerance toward a particular group or view (Gibson, 
2011). Therefore, when a researcher in this area asks whether a group should have free speech, 
the intention is to capture whether the participant believes their government should allow this 
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group to have freedom of expression. Thus, their outcome variables aren’t measures of whether 
the participant, as an individual, is interested in hearing this perspective or whether they, as an 
individual, think this speech is objectionable. But rather, these studies measure whether the 
participant believes their government should allow free speech in general and for specific views. 
In contrast, this study asked participants about their individual willingness to be open to a 
specific point of view. Thus, this research more closely targets participants’ personal willingness 
to engage with outgroup views.  
Second, this is the first study I know of that uses both partisan identity and individual 
differences in open-mindedness to predict receptivity to outgroup views. Political scientists have 
used many different types of political attitude measures in their past research, such as support for 
democracy (Hurwitz & Mondak, 2002). However, I know of no past work that has instead 
measured participants’ dispositional tendency to be tolerant or open to various points of view. In 
demonstrating that trait OM does, on average, predict greater open-mindedness and that trait OM 
does not moderate partisan bias this dissertation provides a valuable addition to political 
intolerance literature. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to use a personality 
measure to replicate and extend the findings obtained by political scientists. 
Study 2 also advances the political intolerance literature in another interesting way. This 
literature has never established whether participants are aware of the incongruence between their 
general endorsements of tolerance and the rejection of certain groups. In Study 2, I asked 
participants to rate how open-minded they were in a general sense and then predict how they 
thought they would react to specific outgroup views. These results indicated that even the 
participants who rated themselves as highly open-minded did not predict they would be open to 
outgroup views. Thus, this dissertation provides the first evidence that people are acutely aware 
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of how partisan bias limits their openness. In my future research I would like to examine how 
participants reconcile this incongruity. For example, what kinds of explanations participants use 
to resolve any dissonance that this discrepancy between self-rated traits and behavior may 
provoke.  
Predictive Validity of Trait OM  
Second, this research is relevant to the literature on the predictive validity of trait 
measures. As discussed in the introduction, there is a long history of research on how well trait 
measures predict behavior (e.g., Lahey, 2009; Roberts et al., 2007). There is also a wealth of 
research examining how the PT scale predicts behaviors such as stereotyping (e.g., Axtell et al., 
2007; Franzoi, Davis, Young, & Richard 1985; Grant & Berry, 2011; Ku, Wang, & Galinsky, 
2010; Parker & Axtell, 2001). However, I know of no research that has examined the predictive 
validity of measures of dispositional open-mindedness for reactions to counter-attitudinal 
political views.  
The results of this dissertation do suggest that trait OM is a good predictor of open 
reactions. The main effect of trait OM found in this dissertation did demonstrate that those 
scoring high (vs. low) in trait OM were, on average, more open to political views. However, 
there was no evidence that trait OM tempered the effect of partisan bias. Moreover, in Study 2 
participants who scored high in trait OM didn’t predict that their own dispositional open-
mindedness would result in greater openness to outgroup views. Thus, highly open-minded 
people don’t believe they will be, and in fact aren’t, open to outgroup politics.  
This lack of a moderation effect is an important finding for the literature on trait OM. I 
would argue that being open to differing views is an archetypal example of what it means to be 
open-minded. This dissertation shows that high scores on trait OM don’t actually predict greater 
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openness to outgroup views. This suggests that research aimed at producing a better measure of 
this construct may be warranted. However, it is important to note that this dissertation only 
studied trait OM in the context of partisan identity and political viewpoints. Thus, conclusions 
drawn from this work about the predictive validity of trait OM may only be relevant in this 
specific domain. In my future research, I would like to examine these hypotheses for a different 
social identity and in a different intergroup setting (e.g., sports rivalries).  
Frame of Reference Effects 
A related point concerns the literature on predictor and criterion matching (Swann, 
Chang-Schneider, & McClarty, 2007). This research has demonstrated that narrow measures are 
often better at predicting behavior relative to abstract personality measures. By narrow I mean 
measures that capture more precisely defined aspects of personality (i.e., need for cognition, 
need for affect), rather than a more general disposition (i.e., neuroticism, agreeableness). 
Although the measure of trait OM used here was reasonably narrow, in my future research I 
would like to explore how my results might shift if I were to use a more targeted predictor. There 
are several insights from the Frame of Reference Literature (FoR) that I believe are relevant to 
these considerations.  
The literature on FoR effects provides robust evidence that creating highly contextualized 
trait measures can improve predictive validity for concrete behavioral outcomes (Holtropp et al., 
2014, Holtropp, Born, & de Vries, 2014; Robie et al., 2017; Schmit et al., 1995). For example, 
imagine that you were trying to predict whether someone is a hard worker. An FoR researcher 
would first suggest you specify your research question even further, meaning a hard worker in 
what context? If you are trying to predict whether the subject is a hard-worker at school, then 
you should ask that specific question: To what degree are you a hard-worker at school? You 
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could also ask whether they are a hard worker at work or at home. But by asking participants 
how they perceive themselves in specific environments, this research suggests you may improve 
your ability to predict behavior within that same environment.  
In the context of this dissertation, I wanted to test the efficacy of commonly used scales, 
which by and large tend not to be contextualized. In my future research, I would like to employ 
an FoR approach and examine whether narrowing my measure of trait OM improves predictive 
validity within the domain of politics. Thus, instead of asking “How open are you to other’s 
opinions?”, I might ask “How open are you to other’s political opinions?” Of course, one must 
be cautious about being so specific that your predictor becomes functionally indistinguishable 
from your outcome variable. Thus, I would not ask “How open are you to counter-attitudinal 
Facebook posts?” Fortunately, there is a version of the OMC scale that specifically asks about 
openness to political views (Price et al., 2015). I did not use this contextualized version of OMC 
here, as a) there is no parallel scale for PT and b) as previously stated, I was interested in more 
typical methods of capturing traits. However, I would like to incorporate this version of the scale 
into my future work (see below).  
Affect and Open-Mindedness  
As was previously discussed, this dissertation is the first study I am aware of that 
examines the relationship between trait OM and affective reactions. I was also interested in the 
association between affective reactions and cognitive receptivity. The pattern of correlations in 
both studies demonstrated that receptivity was positively associated with positive affect and 
negatively associated with negative affect. Thus, participants tend to be cognitively open to 
points of view that “feel good” and less open to views that “feel bad”. Although this finding is 
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not particularly novel, this is the first study to measure the affective reactions that co-occur with 
cognitive receptivity.  
Of greater theoretical importance, this dissertation also demonstrated a reliable main 
effect of trait OM in predicting reduced negative affect, but no interaction with partisan identity. 
Thus, similar to the findings for cognitive reactions, participants who considered themselves to 
be open-minded were just as likely to react to outgroup views negatively as people who scored 
low in trait OM. Similarly, for positive affect I found no main effects of trait OM, nor any 
interactions with partisan identity. Thus, participants who considered themselves to be open-
minded were not any more likely to react to outgroup views positively compared to people who 
scored low in trait OM. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to demonstrate the 
affective consequences of partisan identity and trait OM. In my future research I would like to 
continue to explore the role of affect in open-mindedness. For example, by examining the 
consequences of priming threat (e.g., having participants read that an opposing political party is 
likely to win an important election) prior to measuring participants’ affective and cognitive 
reactions to outgroup political views.  
Affective and Behavioral Forecasting  
 Finally, this dissertation is relevant to the research on affective and behavioral 
forecasting. Prior work has shown that people often are not adept at predicting how they will feel 
or behave in future scenarios (e.g., Sandstrom & Dunn, 2011; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). 
However, in this dissertation the “predictors” were remarkably accurate in estimating how a 
sample of similar “experiencers” reacted to political points of view. The results demonstrated the 
“predictors” expected they would only be open to attitudinally consistent points of view, despite 
how open-minded they perceived themselves to be. The results obtained with the “experiencers” 
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in Study 1 were exactly parallel to this. There was a small tendency to over-estimate the intensity 
of all three outcome variables, but the general pattern of results was very similar across the two 
studies. This suggests that strong partisans are acutely aware of how their identity limits the 
degree to which they are open to other’s political views, regardless of how open-minded they 
may simultaneously believe themselves to be. This is an interesting addition to the affective 
forecasting literature, particularly as it relates to previously discussed work by Dorison et al. 
(2019). Their study also found that participants’ affective forecasting errors underlie selective 
exposure to politically consistent news and media. In the future, I would like to examine whether 
partisans’ apparent awareness that they are not open to outgroup views predicts avoidance of 
counter-attitudinal news.  
Future Directions 
In the previous section I briefly alluded to some avenues for future research. I will lay out 
the future directions of this research more explicitly here. First, I would like to use this paradigm 
to examine the predictive validity of trait OM in a different domain. I would need to find a social 
identity similar to partisan identity in that there are clear ingroup and outgroup distinctions. One 
potential domain is sports rivalries (e.g., Miami Dolphins vs. New York Jets, Cardinals vs. 
Cubs). Second, I would like to use this same paradigm, but instead of the present measure of trait 
OM, utilize a contextualized measure as suggested by the literature on FoR effects.  
I am also interested in developing new paradigms to test hypotheses related to trait OM. 
For example, I would like to develop a study in which participants provide longer written 
reactions to outgroup Facebook posts. I would be able to look for more subtle differences in 
these written pieces to indicate whether participants were giving the author’s point of view open-
minded consideration. There is also a literature on experimentally manipulating whether 
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participants receive instructions priming perspective-taking motivations (e.g., Batson, Early, & 
Salvarani, 1997; Davis et al., 1996) and similar work priming empathic motivations (e.g., Batson 
et al., 1981; Batson & Ahmad, 2009). I would like to incorporate this into future research by 
randomly assigning participants to read instructions asking them to be open-minded or to read 
materials indicating the importance of open-mindedness to people who share their partisan 
identity prior to reacting to outgroup views.  
Finally, I am very interested in further examining the findings from Study 2 
demonstrating that participants are aware of the limitations of trait OM in attenuating partisan 
bias. In particular, I would like to study the types of explanations that participants use to justify 
the conflict between their endorsements of their own trait OM and their predictions that they will 
not be open to outgroup political views. I predict that, in the domain of politics, there may be 
some form of moral ranking (Bartels, 2008; Nichols, 2002; van Willigenburg, 2000). By this I 
mean that the personal importance that participants place on being open-minded might be 
significantly lower than the importance of rejecting perspectives that are seen as immoral or 
unethical. If this were found to be true, participants’ awareness of their own inconsistencies as 
observed in Study 2 would represent a conscious moral choice rather than an unconscious 
hypocrisy.  
Conclusion 
 The idea that personality traits like open-mindedness or empathy may serve to attenuate 
bias is very compelling. However, the results of this dissertation provide no evidence that trait 
OM does, in fact, predict greater openness to counter-attitudinal views. My past research has 
dealt with similar questions regarding dispositional empathy (Davis, 1983). In this research I 
made several attempts to capture the capacity for empathy to reduce bias toward stigmatized 
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outgroups. For example, I have examined whether empathy mitigates the tendency for SDO to 
predict greater attributions of blame toward victims of sexual assault, AIDS patients, and victims 
of police shootings. In some cases, I found evidence to support this idea, but the effects tended to 
be small and didn’t always replicate. In each case, just as in this dissertation, the most reliable 
finding was that SDO predicted greater blame and lower sympathy for stigmatized targets, 
regardless of a participant’s level of dispositional empathy.  
Even in the face of these previous results, the idea that open-mindedness could provide a 
brake on people’s pre-existing prejudices seemed sensible. As such, I designed this dissertation 
to be a much more direct examination of the potential for personality traits to attenuate bias. 
However, yet again I did not find results that supported this idea. Taken together, these data 
suggest it may be reasonable to set this notion aside or to consider re-conceptualizing common 
measures of trait-based open-mindedness and empathy. In Study 2, the participants demonstrated 
that they were already aware of what my data have indicated across several paradigms. Namely 
that in the end, dispositional open-mindedness and empathy are traits that can predict benevolent 
outcomes, but the capacity for a trait to operate in this way is limited by pre-existing biases. 
Perhaps the most profitable avenue for future work in this domain is to examine how to 
effectively increase motivations to overcome these biases so that the better angels of our traits 
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ANOVA testing for order effects (Study 1) 
 
Variables df F p 
Trait Open-Mindedness 1, 227 .21 .664 
Strong Liberal Receptivity 1, 227 .46 .498 
Moderate Liberal Receptivity 1, 227 .09 .767 
Moderate Conservative Receptivity 1, 227 .14 .704 
Strong Conservative Receptivity 1, 227 .78 .380 
Strong Liberal Positive Affect 1, 227 1.31 .253 
Moderate Liberal Positive Affect 1, 227 .17 .681 
Moderate Conservative Positive Affect 1, 225 2.23 .137 
Strong Conservative Positive Affect 1, 226 1.43 .232 
Strong Liberal Negative Affect 1, 225 .05 .824 
Moderate Liberal Negative Affect 1, 226 .39 .531 
Moderate Conservative Negative Affect 1, 227 .99 .321 
Strong Conservative Negative Affect 1, 227  1.89 .171 








Means and Standard Deviations for Dependent Variables (Study 1) 
 
Variables MEAN SD 
Strong Liberal Receptivity 50.34 29.48 
Moderate Liberal Receptivity 54.40 26.81 
Moderate Conservative Receptivity 47.49 26.22 
Strong Conservative Receptivity 43.53 28.14 
Strong Liberal Positive Affect 25.68 28.37 
Moderate Liberal Positive Affect 29.53 27.53 
Moderate Conservative Positive Affect 18.74 23.14 
Strong Conservative Positive Affect 21.16 26.18 
Strong Liberal Negative Affect 33.53 31.85 
Moderate Liberal Negative Affect 22.38 22.77 
Moderate Conservative Negative Affect 32.37 27.75 




























Trait OM 1.00 .29** .30** .09 .04 .07 .09 -.10 -.13* -.21** -.14* .04 .06 
SL Recept. .29** 1.00 .55** .01 -.22** .55** .34** .02 -.23** -.31** -.05 .27** .43** 
ML Recept. .30** .55** 1.00 .12 .01 .31** .61** .11 .00 -.02 -.15* .26** .33** 
MC Recept. .09 .01 .12 1.00 .51** .07 .11 .53** .27** .20** .25** -.21** -.06 
SC Recept. .04 -.22** .01 .51** 1.00 -.19** .01 .23** .67** .33** .22** -.05 -.37** 
SL Pos .07 .55** .31** .07 -.19** 1.00 .55** .35** .00 -.28** .05 .18** .33** 
ML Pos .09 .34** .61** .11 .01 .55** 1.00 .40** .26** -.05 -.08 .22** .31** 
MC Pos -.10 .02 .11 .53** .23** .35** .40** 1.00 .43** .21** .28** -.14* .06 
SC Pos -.13* -.23** .00 .27** .67** .00 .26** .43** 1.00 .41** .32** .05 -.29** 
SL Neg -.21** -.31** -.02 .20** .33** -.28** -.05 .21** .41** 1.00 .53** .31** -.01 
ML Neg -.14* -.05 -.15* .25** .22** .05 -.08 .28** .32** .53** 1.00 .31** .14* 
MC Neg .04 .27** .26** -.21** -.05 .18** .22** -.14* .05 .31** .31** 1.00 .37** 
SC Neg .06 .43** .33** -.06 -.37** .33** .31** .06 -.29** -.01 .14* .37** 1.00 
SL Recept., Strong Liberal Receptivity; ML Recept., Moderate Liberal Receptivity; MC Recept., Moderate Conservative Receptivity; SC Recept., 
Strong Conservative Receptivity; SL Pos., Strong Liberal Positive Affect; ML Pos., Moderate Liberal Positive Affect; MC Pos., Moderate 
Conservative Positive Affect; SC Pos., Strong Conservative Positive Affect; SL Neg., Strong Liberal Negative Affect; ML Neg., Moderate Liberal 








GLM for Cognitive Receptivity (Study 1) 
 
Variables df F p ηp2 
Partisan Identity 1, 225 .91 .340 .00 
Trait OM 1, 225 17.78 <.001 .07 
Partisan Identity*Trait OM  1, 225 .19 .667 .00 
Post Ideology 1, 225 15.42 <.001 .06 
Post Ideology*Partisan Identity 1, 225 168.24 <.001 .43 
Post Ideology*Trait OM 1, 225 5.00 .026 .02 
Post Ideology*Partisan Identity*Trait OM 1, 225 .001 .977 .00 
Post Extremity 1, 225 11.71 .001 .05 
Post Extremity *Partisan Identity 1, 225 1.25 .265 .01 
Post Extremity *Trait OM 1, 225 .001 .977 .00 
Post Extremity *Partisan Identity*Trait OM 1, 225 .71 .400 .00 
Post Ideology*Post Extremity 1, 225 .000 .990 .00 
Post Ideology*Post Extremity*Partisan Identity 1, 225 23.51 <.001 .10 
Post Ideology*Post Extremity*Trait OM 1, 225 .16 .686 .00 




Additional Regression Analyses for Receptivity (Study 1) 
 
SL 
 Variables B SE B β t CI R2 
Step 1       .41 
 
 
Trait OM 7.66 1.67 .24 4.58*** 4.37  10.95  
PI 32.06 3.09 .55 10.37*** 25.96  38.15  
Step 2        .41 
 Trait OM* PI -3.59 3.39 -.07 -1.06 -10.26  3.09  
ML 
 Variables B SE B β t CI R2 
Step 1       .41 
 
Trait OM 6.69 1.76 .23 3.80*** 3.22 10.16  
PI 16.99 3.26 .32 5.21*** 10.56 23.41  
Step 2        .41 
 Trait OM*PI 1.66 3.58 .04 .46 -5.39  8.71  
MC 
 Variables B SE B β t CI R2 
Step 1       .31 
 Trait OM 3.29 1.80 .12 1.83 -.26 6.84  
 PI -15.6 3.33 -.30 -4.64*** -22.02  -8.89  
Step 2        .31 
 Trait OM* PI -1.56 3.66 -.04 .67 -8.76  5.65  
SC 
 
 Variables B SE B β t CI R2 
Step 1        .45 
 Trait OM 2.60 1.81 .09 1.43 -.97 6.16  
 PI -25.41 3.35 -.45 -7.59*** -32.01  -18.81  
Step 2        .45 
 Trait OM*PI -.59 3.68 -.01 -.16 -7.84  6.66  
Post Type: SL, strong liberal; ML, moderate liberal; MC, moderate conservative; SC, strong conservative.  





GLM for Positive Affect (Study 1) 
 
Variables df F p ηp2 
Partisan Identity 1, 223 .71 .402 .00 
Trait OM 1, 223 .10 .750 .00 
Partisan Identity*Trait OM  1, 223 .00 .967 .00 
Post Ideology 1, 223 27.59 <.001 .11 
Post Ideology*Partisan Identity 1, 223 103.92 <.001 .32 
Post Ideology*Trait OM 1, 223 5.55 .019 .02 
Post Ideology*Partisan Identity*Trait OM 1, 223 .26 .614 .00 
Post Extremity 1, 223 .39 .532 .00 
Post Extremity *Partisan Identity 1, 223 .19 .666 .00 
Post Extremity *Trait OM 1, 223 .91 .340 .00 
Post Extremity *Partisan Identity*Trait OM 1, 223 2.97 .086 .01 
Post Ideology*Post Extremity 1, 223 6.30 .013 .03 
Post Ideology*Post Extremity*Partisan Identity 1, 223 19.08 <.001 .08 
Post Ideology*Post Extremity*Trait OM 1, 223 .00 .999 .00 





Additional Regression Analyses for Positive Affect (Study 1) 
 
SL 
 Variables B SE B β t CI R2 
Step 1       .40 
 
 
Trait OM .92 1.88 .03 .490 -2.78 4.62  
PI 22.17 3.48 .39 6.38*** 15.32 29.02  
Step 2       .40 
 Trait OM* PI -1.95 3.82 -.04 -.51 -9.47 5.57  
ML 
 Variables B SE B β t CI R2 
Step 1       .23 
 
Trait OM 1.96 1.93 .07 1.01 -1.85 5.77  
PI 11.52 3.58 .21 3.22** 4.46 18.57  
Step 2       .23 
 Trait OM*PI .61 3.93 .01 .16 -7.13 8.36  
MC 
 Variables B SE B β t CI R2 
Step 1       .17 
 Trait OM -2.03 1.65 -.08 -1.23 -5.28 1.22  
 PI -6.51 3.06 -.14 -2.13* -12.53 -.49  
Step 2       .18 
 Trait OM* PI 3.51 3.34 .09 1.05 -3.08 10.10  
SC 
 
 Variables B SE B β t CI R2 
Step 1        .39 
 Trait OM -2.73 1.74 -.10 -1.57 -6.16 .70  
 PI -19.12 3.23 -.37 -5.93*** -25.48 -12.76  
Step 2       .39 
 Trait OM*PI -1.72 3.54 -.04 -.49 -8.68 525  
Post Type: SL, strong liberal; ML, moderate liberal; MC, moderate conservative; SC, strong conservative.  





GLM for Negative Affect (Study 1)  
 
Variables df F p ηp2 
Partisan Identity 1, 223 2.93 .088 .01 
Trait OM 1, 223 3.18 .076 .01 
Partisan Identity*Trait OM  1, 223 1.25 .264 .01 
Post Ideology 1, 223 6.77 .010 .03 
Post Ideology*Partisan Identity 1, 223 85.79 <.001 .28 
Post Ideology*Trait OM 1, 223 6.52 .011 .03 
Post Ideology*Partisan Identity*Trait OM 1, 223 2.10 .148 .01 
Post Extremity 1, 223 17.55 <.001 .07 
Post Extremity *Partisan Identity 1, 223 .55 .460 .00 
Post Extremity *Trait OM 1, 223 .68 .412 .00 
Post Extremity *Partisan Identity*Trait OM 1, 223 2.72 .101 .01 
Post Ideology*Post Extremity 1, 223 12.87 <.001 .06 
Post Ideology*Post Extremity*Partisan Identity 1, 223 5.84 .016 .03 
Post Ideology*Post Extremity*Trait OM 1, 223 .59 .445 .00 





Additional Regression Analyses for Negative Affect (Study 1) 
 
SL 
 Variables B SE B β t CI R2 
Step 1       .32 
 
 
Trait OM -6.25 2.19 -.18 -2.86** -10.56 -1.94  
PI -15.41 4.05 -.24 -3.81*** -23.38 -7.43  
Step 2       .33 
 Trait OM* PI 4.90 4.43 .09 1.11 -3.83 13.63  
ML 
 Variables B SE B β t CI R2 
Step 1       .20 
 
Trait OM -3.03 1.62 -.12 -1.88 -6.21 .15  
PI -6.50 2.98 -.14 -2.18* -12.38 -.62  
Step 2       .23 
 Trait OM*PI -5.73 3.26 -.15 -1.76 -12.15 .68  
MC 
 Variables B SE B β t CI R2 
Step 1       .30 
 Trait OM .25 1.91 .01 .13 -3.51 4.00  
 PI 16.80 3.53 .30 4.76*** 9.85 23.75  
Step 2       .31 
 Trait OM* PI -4.58 3.86 -.10 -.10 -12.19 3.03  
SC 
 
 Variables B SE B β t CI R2 
Step 1        .40 
 Trait OM .65 1.89 .02 .34 -3.08 4.38  
 PI 22.42 3.50 .39 6.40*** 15.51 29.32  
Step 2       .41 
 Trait OM*PI -6.36 3.83 -.13 -1.66 -13.90 1.18  
Post Type: SL, strong liberal; ML, moderate liberal; MC, moderate conservative; SC, strong conservative.  
PI: Partisan Identity (0 = Republican ,1= Democrat).  






ANOVA testing for order effects (Study 2) 
 
Variables df F p 
Trait Open-Mindedness 1, 227 .99 .320 
Strong Liberal Receptivity 1, 227 .94 .333 
Moderate Liberal Receptivity 1, 227 .92 .339 
Moderate Conservative Receptivity 1, 227 1.22 .270 
Strong Conservative Receptivity 1, 227 2.49 .116 
Strong Liberal Positive Affect 1, 227 5.88 .016 
Moderate Liberal Positive Affect 1, 227 .08 .777 
Moderate Conservative Positive Affect 1, 227 .93 .336 
Strong Conservative Positive Affect 1, 227 2.82 .094 
Strong Liberal Negative Affect 1, 227 .09 .770 
Moderate Liberal Negative Affect 1, 227 .13 .721 
Moderate Conservative Negative Affect 1, 227 .00 .992 






Means and Standard Deviations for Dependent Variables (Study 2) 
 
Variables MEAN SD 
Strong Liberal Receptivity 60.98 26.42 
Moderate Liberal Receptivity 64.09 23.03 
Moderate Conservative Receptivity 58.67 23.92 
Strong Conservative Receptivity 52.33 25.06 
Strong Liberal Positive Affect 35.53 28.97 
Moderate Liberal Positive Affect 37.02 26.33 
Moderate Conservative Positive Affect 27.52 24.26 
Strong Conservative Positive Affect 28.52 27.07 
Strong Liberal Negative Affect 36.61 30.27 
Moderate Liberal Negative Affect 28.44 25.91 
Moderate Conservative Negative Affect 37.03 26.45 
Strong Conservative Negative Affect 40.71 28.17 
Trait OM, Trait Open-Mindedness; RWA, Right-Wing Authoritarianism; SDO, Social-


































SL Recept. .25** 1.00 .44** -.08 -.26** .58** .30** -.13* -.19** -.48** -.14* .15* .12 
ML Recept. .18** .44** 1.00 .08 -.12 .21** .56** .04 -.13 -.15* -.28** .10 .17* 
MC Recept. .08 -.08 .08 1.00 .42** .00 .08 .56** .34** .22** .18** -.29** -.09 
SC Recept. -.07 -.26** -.12 .42** 1.00 -.08 .02 .39** .67** .32** .22** -.08 -.35** 
SL Pos .18** .58** .21** .00 -.08 1.00 .48** .19** .14* -.42** -.09 .11 .11 
ML Pos .05 .30** .56** .08 .02 .48** 1.00 .30** .19** -.13* -.20** .08 .13* 
MC Pos -.06 -.13* .04 .56** .39** .19** .30** 1.00 .58** .25** .21** -.21** -.10 
SC Pos -.09 -.19** -.13 .34** .67** .14* .19** .58** 1.00 .27** .28** -.05 -.32** 
SL Neg -.17** -.48** -.15* .22** .32** -.42** -.13* .25** .27** 1.00 .49** .17* .17* 
ML Neg -.17** -.14* -.28** .18** .22** -.09 -.202** .21** .28** .49** 1.00 .40** .22** 
MC Neg -.08 .15* .10 -.29** -.08 .11 .08 -.21** -.05 .17* .40** 1.00 .48** 
SC Neg -.06 .12 .17* -.09 -.35** .11 .13* -.10 -.32** .17* .22** .48** 1.00 
SL Recept., Strong Liberal Receptivity; ML Recept., Moderate Liberal Receptivity; MC Recept., Moderate Conservative Receptivity; SC Recept., 
Strong Conservative Receptivity; SL Pos., Strong Liberal Positive Affect; ML Pos., Moderate Liberal Positive Affect; MC Pos., Moderate 
Conservative Positive Affect; SC Pos., Strong Conservative Positive Affect; SL Neg., Strong Liberal Negative Affect; ML Neg., Moderate Liberal 






GLM for Predicted Cognitive Receptivity (Study 2) 
 
Variables df F p ηp2 
Partisan Identity 1,225 1.89 .171 .01 
Trait OM 1,225 11.34 .001 .05 
Partisan Identity*Trait OM 1,225 .41 .522 .00 
Statement Ideology 1, 225 15.23 <.001 .06 
Statement Ideology*Partisan Identity 1, 225 230.42 <.001 .51 
Statement Ideology*Trait OM 1, 225 .45 .501 .00 
Statement Ideology*Partisan Identity*Trait OM 1, 225 .15 .700 .00 
Statement Extremity 1, 225 13.39 <.001 .06 
Statement Extremity *Partisan Identity 1, 225 .13 .721 .00 
Statement Extremity *Trait OM 1, 225 .10 .754 .00 
Statement Extremity *Partisan Identity*Trait OM 1, 225 .01 .941 .00 
Statement Ideology* Statement Extremity 1, 225 .90 .344 .00 
Statement Ideology* Statement Extremity*Partisan Identity 1, 225 26.82 <.001 .11 
Statement Ideology* Statement Extremity*Trait OM 1, 225 1.47 .227 .01 
Statement Ideology* Statement Extremity*Partisan 
Identity*Trait OM 1, 225 .41 .737 .00 
 
 131 
Table 14  
Additional Regression Analyses for Predicted Receptivity (Study 2) 
 
SL 
 Variables B SE B β t CI R2 
Step 1       .54 
 
 
Trait OM 3.30 1.64 .12 2.01* .07 6.53  
PI 26.23 3.07 .50 8.54** 20.17 32.28  
Step 2        .54 
 Trait OM* PI .98 3.31 .02 .30 -5.55 7.51  
ML 
 Variables B SE B β t CI R2 
Step 1       .35 
 
Trait OM 2.20 1.59 .09 1.39 -.93 5.33  
PI 14.60 2.98 .32 4.90*** 8.74 20.47  
Step 2        .35 
 Trait OM*PI .31 3.21 .01 .10 -6.02 6.64  
MC 
 Variables B SE B β t CI R2 
Step 1       .39 
 Trait OM 4.73 1.63 .19 2.91** 1.52 7.94  
 PI -18.70 3.05 -.39 -6.13*** -24.71 -12.69  
Step 2        .39 
 Trait OM* PI 2.44 3.29 .06 .74 -4.04 8.92  
SC 
 
 Variables B SE B β t CI R2 
Step 1        .62 
 Trait OM 2.80 1.45 .11 1.93 -.06 5.65  
 PI -32.16 2.71 -.64 -11.86*** -37.50 -26.81  
Step 2        .62 
 Trait OM*PI 1.36 2.92 .03 .47 -4.40 7.12  
Post Type: SL, strong liberal; ML, moderate liberal; MC, moderate conservative; SC, strong conservative 
PI: Partisan Identity (0 = Republican ,1= Democrat).  




GLM for Predicted Positive Affect (Study 2) 
 
Variables df F p ηp2 
Partisan Identity  1, 225 6.40 .012 .03 
Trait OM 1, 225 1.87 .173 .01 
Partisan Identity*Trait OM 1, 225 .87 .343 .00 
Statement Ideology 1, 225 20.00 <.001 .08 
Statement Ideology*Partisan Identity 1, 225 117.80 <.001 .34 
Statement Ideology*Trait OM 1, 225 .30 .585 .00 
Statement Ideology*Partisan Identity*Trait OM 1, 225 .60 .440 .00 
Statement Extremity 1, 225 .08 .783 .00 
Statement Extremity *Partisan Identity 1, 225 1.26 .263 .01 
Statement Extremity *Trait OM 1, 225 2.47 .118 .01 
Statement Extremity *Partisan Identity*Trait OM 1, 225 .30 .583 .00 
Statement Ideology* Statement Extremity 1, 225 2.66 .104 .01 
Statement Ideology* Statement Extremity*Partisan Identity 1, 225 13.29 <.001 .06 
Statement Ideology* Statement Extremity*Trait OM 1, 225 1.23 .269 .01 
Statement Ideology* Statement Extremity*Partisan 





Additional Regression Analyses for Predicted Positive Affect (Study 2) 
 
SL 
 Variables B SE B β t CI R2 
Step 1       .29 
 
 
Trait OM 3.69 2.04 .12 1.81 -.33 7.72  
PI 13.61 3.83 .24 3.56*** 6.07 21.16  
Step 2        .31 
 Trait OM* PI 6.44 4.11 .14 1.57 -1.66 14.54  
ML 
 Variables B SE B β t CI R2 
Step 1       .15 
 
Trait OM .42 1.92 .02 .22 -3.36 4.21  
PI 7.62 3.60 .15 2.12* .53 14.70  
Step 2        .15 
 Trait OM*PI 1.20 3.88 .03 .31 -6.45 8.85  
MC 
 Variables B SE B β t CI R2 
Step 1       .35 
 Trait OM .87 1.67 .03 .52 -2.43 4.17  
 PI -17.41 3.14 -.36 -5.55* -23.59 -11.22  
Step 2        .35 
 Trait OM* PI 2.32 3.38 .06 .69 -4.35 8.98  
SC 
 
 Variables B SE B β t CI R2 
Step 1        .53 
 Trait OM 1.76 1.70 .06 1.04 -1.58 5.11  
 PI -29.14 3.18 -.54 -9.16*** -35.41 -22.87  
Step 2        .53 
 Trait OM*PI .13 3.43 .003 .04 -6.63 6.90  
Post Type: SL, strong liberal; ML, moderate liberal; MC, moderate conservative; SC, strong conservative 
PI: Partisan Identity (0 = Republican ,1= Democrat).  






GLM for Predicted Negative Affect (Study 2)  
 
Variables df F p ηp2 
Partisan Identity  1, 225 .68 .410 .00 
Trait OM 1, 225 5.73 .018 .03 
Partisan Identity*Trait OM  1, 225 .43 .511 .00 
Statement Ideology 1, 225 8.52 .004 .04 
Statement Ideology*Partisan Identity 1, 225 98.78 <.001 .31 
Statement Ideology*Trait OM 1, 225 .37 .542 .00 
Statement Ideology*Partisan Identity*Trait OM 1, 225 3.21 .074 .01 
Statement Extremity 1, 225 12.67 .001 .05 
Statement Extremity *Partisan Identity 1, 225 .17 .679 .00 
Statement Extremity *Trait OM 1, 225 .08 .780 .00 
Statement Extremity *Partisan Identity*Trait OM 1, 225 4.21 .041 .02 
Statement Ideology* Statement Extremity 1, 225 5.60 .019 .02 
Statement Ideology* Statement Extremity*Partisan Identity 1, 225 18.79 <.001 .08 
Statement Ideology* Statement Extremity*Trait OM 1, 225 .19 .663 .00 
Statement Ideology* Statement Extremity*Partisan 
Identity*Trait OM 1, 225 1.11 .293 .01 
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Table 18  
Additional Regression Analyses for Predicted Negative Affect (Study 2) 
 
SL 
 Variables B SE B β t CI R2 
Step 1       .42 
 
 
Trait OM -2.15 2.02 -.07 -1.06 -6.14 1.84  
PI -24.04 3.79 -.40 -6.34*** -31.52 -16.57  
Step 2        .42 
 Trait OM* PI -3.10 4.09 -.06 -.76 -11.16 4.96  
ML 
 Variables B SE B β t CI R2 
Step 1       .28 
 
Trait OM -2.92 1.83 -.11 -1.59 -6.53 .69  
PI -12.28 3.43 -.24 -3.58*** -19.04 -5.51  
Step 2        .31 
 Trait OM*PI -6.80 3.68 -.16 -1.85 -14.04 .45  
MC 
 Variables B SE B β t CI R2 
Step 1       .18 
 Trait OM -3.62 1.92 -.13 -1.89 -7.40 .16  
 PI 8.95 3.59 .17 2.49* 1.87 16.03  
Step 2        .19 
 Trait OM* PI -3.41 3.87 -.08 -.88 -11.03 4.22  
SC 
 
 Variables B SE B β t CI R2 
Step 1        .32 
 Trait OM -4.37 1.97 -.15 -2.22* -8.25 -.50  
 PI 18.54 3.68 .33 5.03*** 11.28 25.80  
Step 2        .34 
 Trait OM*PI 5.85 3.96 .13 1.48 -1.95 13.64  
Post Type: SL, strong liberal; ML, moderate liberal; MC, moderate conservative; SC, strong conservative 
PI: Partisan Identity (0 = Republican ,1= Democrat).  




Table 19.  
Mean scores for all dependent variables in Study 1 and 2.  
 








Predictors (Study 2) 46.24 55.79 68.57 67.28 
Experiencers (Study 1) 33.50 45.32 56.04 54.93 
Democrats 
Predictors (Study 2) 74.14 71.51 37.83 50.98 
Experiencers (Study 1) 67.02 63.59 31.13 40.10 








Predictors (Study 2) 27.35 32.89 43.44 36.48 
Experiencers (Study 1) 14.26 23.65 31.00 22.19 
Democrats 
Predictors (Study 2) 42.84 40.72 15.20 19.52 
Experiencers (Study 1) 36.78 35.71 11.34 15.31 








Predictors (Study 2) 46.89 35.71 32.09 33.28 
Experiencers (Study 1) 41.83 25.94 20.93 23.88 
Democrats 
Predictors (Study 2) 24.75 21.95 48.40 40.38 
Experiencers (Study 1) 25.31 18.95 42.92 40.41 
















Two-way Interaction between Partisan Identity and Facebook Post Ideology for Cognitive 





Three-way Interaction between Partisan Identity, Facebook Post Ideology, and Post Extremity 






Figure 4  









Three-way Interaction between Partisan Identity, Facebook Post Ideology, and Post Extremity 


















Three-way Interaction between Partisan Identity, Facebook Post Ideology, and Post Extremity 





Figure 8  
Two-way Interaction between Negative Affect and Partisan Identity for Cognitive Receptivity to 








































Two-way Interaction between Positive Affect and Partisan Identity for Cognitive Receptivity to 
Moderate Liberal posts (Study 1) 
 
Figure 9b 
Two-way Interaction between Positive Affect and Partisan Identity for Cognitive Receptivity to 









































































Two-way Interaction between Positive Affect and Partisan Identity for Cognitive Receptivity to 





























































Two-way Interaction between Positive Affect and Trait OM for Cognitive Receptivity to Strong 
Liberal posts (Study 1) 
Figure 11b 
Two-way Interaction between Positive Affect and Trait OM for Cognitive Receptivity to 











































































Two-way Interaction between Partisan Identity and Statement Ideology for Predicted Cognitive 







Three-way Interaction between Partisan Identity and Statement Ideology and Statement 







Three-way Interaction between Partisan Identity and Statement Ideology and Statement 






Two-way Interaction between Statement Ideology and Statement Extremity for Predicted 







Three-way Interaction between Partisan Identity and Statement Ideology and Statement 







Perspective Taking Scale (PT) 
 
1. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view. (-) 
2. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision. 
3. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their 
perspective. 
4. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's 
arguments. (-) 
5. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both. 
6. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while. 





Open-Minded Cognition (OMC)  
 
1. I have no patience for (political/ religious) arguments I disagree with.  
2. I often “tune out” (political/ religious) messages I disagree with.  
3. I believe it is a waste of time to pay attention to certain (political/ religious) ideas.  
4. I try to reserve judgment until I have a chance to hear arguments from both sides of an 
(political/ religious) issue.  
5. (When it comes to politics/ religion) I am open to considering other viewpoints.  












I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a 
decision.  0.74 
 
When thinking about an issue, I consider as many different 
opinions as possible.  0.73 
 
I try to reserve judgement until I have a chance to hear arguments 
from both sides of an issue. 0.70 
 
I am open to considering other viewpoints.  0.70  
I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at 
them both.  0.69 
 
I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how 
things look from their perspective.  0.67 
 
Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I 
were in their place.  0.67 
 
When I’m upset at someone, I usually try to “put myself in his 
shoes” for a while  0.63 
 
If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time 
listening to other people's arguments. (-)   
0.55  
I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" 
point of view. (-)  0.52 
 
I often “tune out” messages I disagree with.  0.46  
I have no patience for arguments I disagree with.  0.48  








Instructions: This initial section will take no more than 10 seconds to complete. Our research is 
oriented towards assessing respondents who meet certain demographic criteria. In order to 
determine whether you meet these criteria, please answer the questions below. You will know if 
you met the criteria within a few seconds, just by responding to the items below. If you don't 
meet the criteria, you can just simply return the HIT. Doing so will not affect your worker rating 
in any way whatsoever. If you do meet the criteria, rest assured, you can then complete the rest 
of our survey uninterrupted.  








2. Age  
 
3. How would you describe your political party preference? 
a. Extremely Strong Democrat 
b. Moderately Strong Democrat 
c. Lean Democrat 
d. Independent 
e. Lean Republican 
f. Moderately Strong 
Republican 
g. Extremely Strong Republican 
h. None of these labels applies 
to me  








h. Agnostic  
i. Spiritual, but not religious 
j. Other  
5. Ethnicity  
a. White  






f. Other  
6. What is your highest level of education?  
a. Some high school 
b. High School  
c. Some college/Associate’s 
Degree 
d. Bachelor’s Degree 
e. Some postgraduate study 
f. Master’s degree 






Power analyses were conducted to determine a reasonable number of participants to 
allow for sufficient power in both studies of this dissertation. The estimates for sample size were 
based on the results of a small pilot study (n = 74) with a design similar to the pre-registered 
study. Initial analyses of the pilot test generated some evidence of a two-way interaction of trait 
OM and partisan identity for the moderate conservative posts (p = .069 ). The power analysis 
was generated on the basis of these results. Using G Power (a priori F test, Linear multiple 
regression: Fixed model, R2 increase, power = 0.80, alpha = 0.05), I used the obtained partial R2 
of 0.041 and a model testing 2 predictors (i.e., trait OM and partisan identity). The results 
indicated that a total sample of 229 participants was needed to obtain adequate power. It is 
important to note that at the time I conducted these power analyses the analysis plan for this 
dissertation was to run four separate regression analyses corresponding to the four 
ideology/extremity levels of the Facebook posts rather than an omnibus GLM. Both types of 




Appendix F  
Exclusion Criteria 
 
Exclusion screen 1: Given the nature of this research, I restricted the sample to U.S. citizens 
based on self-report to a question at the end of the survey (i.e. Are you a U.S. citizen?).  
 
Exclusion screen 2: This survey contained four tasks designed to flag “farmers” and non-
conscientious subjects. Any worker who failed two or more of these screens was automatically 
excluded. Workers who failed one (but passed the other three) were considered on a case by case 
basis prior to analyses.  
 
a. Towards the end of the survey, participants were required to provide a short (minimum 
characters = 45) response to this query: “In a sentence or two, please give your "best 
guess" as to what this study was about. What hypotheses were we testing?” . Farmers 
often write cryptic responses in broken English (e.g., “social judgement study very well. 
this study very useful .i like the study”) or copy pseudo-relevant responses from the 
internet (e.g., “Point estimation and interval estimation, and hypothesis testing are three 
main ways of learning about the population parameter from the sample statistic”).  
 
b. Following a suggestion by Moss and Litman (2018), this task asked participants to 
write down "the 'everyday’ (common) name of the fruit/vegetable pictured below", 
accompanied by a picture of an eggplant. The vast majority of participants write 
“eggplant”, but a small number write Brinjal (a common name for this plant in Asia).  
 
c. In this task, participants were asked to select the correct definition of "moody' from 
four choices (guilty, easy to fool, gullible, emotionally unpredictable).  
 
d. Participants are presented with a picture file containing two statements, both of which 
contain very obvious grammatical errors (e.g., “Last night I couldn’t finishes the job. I 
had a hard time getting motivating; No problem, I completes understanding” ) 
Participants are asked to choose one of four appraisals of these sentences: (a) both 
statements are correct, (b) statement A but not B is correct, (c) statement B but not A is 




Appendix G  
Study 1 Sample Detail 
 
In accordance with the preregistration, after collecting and cleaning the sample I checked the 
number of participants in each category of partisan identity without doing any further analyses. I 
planned to repost the study until each partisan identity category reached 58 participants for a 
total sample of 232. However, after multiple reposts I was only able to obtain a sample of 49 
Extremely Strong Republicans. During data collection I gathered a sample of 57 Extremely 
Strong Democrats, 66 Moderately Strong Democrats, and 65 Moderately Strong Republicans. I 
chose to address the limited sample of Extremely Strong Republicans by increasing the sample 
of Moderately Strong Democrats and Republicans to 65 and narrowing the sample of Extremely 
Strong Democrats to 50 (see table below for comparison of intended vs. actual sample). As I had 
more participants than necessary in some categories, I randomly selected 7 Extremely Strong 
Democrats and 1 Moderately Strong Democrat to exclude from analyses. Random selection was 
conducted using Research Randomizer (www.randomizer.org), as suggested by the Social 














Intended Sample 58 58 58 58 














Appendix I  
Individual Difference Block  
 
Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale  
1. Willingness to be convinced by opposing arguments is a sign of good character.  
2. People should take into consideration evidence that goes against conclusions they favor.  
3. Being undecided or unsure is the result of muddled thinking. 
4. People should revise their conclusions in response to relevant new information.  
5. Changing your mind is a sign of weakness.  
6. People should search actively for reasons why they might be wrong.  
7. It is OK to ignore evidence against your established beliefs.  
8. It is important to be loyal to your beliefs even when evidence is brought to bear against 
them.  
9. There is nothing wrong with being undecided about many issues.  
10. When faced with a puzzling question, we should try to consider more than one possible 




Empathic Concern Scale  
1. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. 
2. Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems. (-) 
3. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them.  
4. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. (-) 
5. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for them. 
(-) 
6. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. 




 Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale (RWA) 
1. What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take 
us back to our true path 
2. It may be considered old fashioned by some, but having a normal proper appearance is 
still the mark of a gentleman and, especially, a lady. 
3. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn. 
4. Our country needs free thinkers who will have the courage to defy traditional ways, even 
if this upsets many people. 
5. Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our government, 
criticising religion, and ignoring the “normal way” things are supposed to be done. 
6. We should treat protestors and radicals with open arms and open minds, since new ideas 
are the lifeblood of progressive change. 
7. The situation in our country is getting so serious, the strongest methods would be justified 
if they eliminated the troublemakers and got us back to our true path. 
8. There is no “ONE right way” to live life; everybody has to create their own way. 
9. Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else. 
10. The real key to the “good life” is obedience, discipline, and sticking to the straight and 
narrow. 
11. Once our government leaders give us the “go ahead”; it will be the duty of every patriotic 
citizen to help stomp out the rot that is poisoning our country from within. 
12. The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional 
values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad 
ideas. 
13. There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse. 
14. Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if 




Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) 
1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. 
2. No one group should dominate society. 
3. Group equality should NOT be our primary goal. 
4. It is unjust to try to make groups equal.  
5. An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom. 
6. Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top. 
7. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. 





The Ten-Item Personality Inventory TIPI 
I see myself as:  
1. _____ Extraverted, enthusiastic.  
2. _____ Critical, quarrelsome.  
3. _____ Dependable, self-disciplined.  
4. _____ Anxious, easily upset.  
5. _____ Open to new experiences, complex.  
6. _____ Reserved, quiet.  
7. _____ Sympathetic, warm.  
8. _____ Disorganized, careless.  
9. _____ Calm, emotionally stable.  




Appendix J.  
Facebook Posts 
 
Instructions: In this section you will read and rate statements similar to what you might see on 
social media websites. The statements will express a variety of opinions on different issues. 
Please read each one carefully. Afterwards, you will be asked to make some ratings of the post 
you just read, using a series of different rating scales. 
 




























































Pilot Test 1.  
 
Scale: 1 (Extremely liberal) to 7 (Extremely conservative) .  
 
Item Mean SD 
The United States should have universal healthcare, or Medicare for 
all. 
2.23 1.71 
We need to forgive student loan debts for many young Americans. 2.23 1.51 
We need raise taxes on the wealthiest Americans. 2.49 1.62 
We need to ban assault rifles. 2.52 1.79 
We need to raise taxes on the wealthy to address the budget deficit. 2.55 1.67 
We need to do more to address the historic wrongs perpetrated on the 
black community. The government should do more to provide aid. 
2.56 1.67 
Income inequality is a serious problem in American society . 2.61 1.57 
Climate change is mostly caused by human activity and we need to 
take steps to address it. 
2.63 1.57 
Transgender people should be allowed to use the bathroom of their 
choice. 
2.66 1.96 
Russian interference in U.S. elections is a serious problem.  2.67 1.65 
Abortion should remain a protected right. 2.70 1.71 
The United States should keep the Affordable Care Act. 2.74 1.65 
LGBTQ Americans have the right to protection from discrimination. 
Businesses should not be allowed to refuse service based on personal 
or religious beliefs. 
2.75 1.67 
We need to get rid of the detention camps at the Southern border. 2.78 1.80 
We need to expand LGBTQ rights. For example, it should be illegal 
to fire someone for their sexual preference. 
2.78 1.56 
We spend too much money on the military. 2.82 1.77 
Transgendered people should be allowed to live as openly and freely 
as anyone else in our society. 
2.82 1.65 
The government should provide aid to those suffering from drug 
addiction. 
2.84 1.48 
Discrimination still limits Black people in the United States today. 2.89 1.52 
We need to fix our immigration system to provide undocumented 




Most wealthy people just had more advantages in life. They aren’t 
necessarily more hard-working than others. 
2.95 1.56 
Currently, women are not equal to men in American society. 2.96 1.69 
The government should not play a role in deciding when abortion is, 
or isn’t, ethical. 
3.04 1.75 
We need to pass common sense gun reforms like universal 
background checks. 
3.06 1.61 
The government should regulate corporations to make sure they are 
engaging in safe and fair practices. 
3.07 1.50 
The government should actively support and fund public 
transportation like trains and buses. 
3.16 1.45 
The government should be working to find solutions for 
homelessness. 
3.23 1.46 
The government should not allow new companies like Uber and 
Postmates to only hire independent contractors. They should have to 
formally hire their employees to protect their labor rights. 
3.29 1.60 
The government should invest in educating people for jobs in the new 
tech economy. 
3.39 1.50 
Public parks and land need to be protected for future generations. 3.41 1.50 
The federal government has the responsibility to take care of safety 
concerns like lead pipes and toxic paint in our homes and workplaces. 
3.49 1.46 
Students with disabilities should be educated in a combined 
classroom together with non-disabled students. 
3.51 1.49 
The way to reduce crime is to invest in community development and 
education. 
3.52 1.57 
Public parks should be run by the government. 3.56 1.47 
The government should regulate the economy to make sure 
Americans and their interests are protected. 
3.57 1.65 
The federal government should set nationwide metrics for 
standardized testing in K-12 education. 
3.73 1.24 
Social security should continue to be a government service. 3.78 1.54 
America should stop meddling in other countries' affairs. 3.79 1.57 
The government needs to build better roads and airports in order to 
boost the economy. 
3.80 1.48 
Students with disabilities should be educated in a separate classroom 
tailored for special education. 
4.11 1.32 
The United States should have both public and private healthcare 
options. 
4.11 1.38 
Individual states should set their own metrics for standardized testing 




The government should invest in bringing back manufacturing jobs. 4.35 1.49 
The United States should keep its current system of healthcare. 4.51 1.71 
Mass transportation is better handled by private services like Uber 
and Lyft rather than government-funded public transportation. 
4.59 1.41 
The government should enforce strict anti-drug laws to deal with 
drug addiction. 
4.70 1.68 
The government should respect the free-market and not regulate the 
economy. 
4.78 1.57 
America should continue to be the leader of the world. 4.82 1.40 
Currently, women are equal to men in American society. 4.88 1.42 
We need to cut government programs to address the budget deficit. 4.93 1.81 
LGBTQ people do not have a right to special legal protections. 5.00 1.81 
Public parks should be run by private businesses. 5.01 1.43 
Social security should be privatized. 5.01 1.55 
I don’t care whether someone says they are transgender, I just don’t 
want it rubbed in my face. 
5.02 1.60 
The government should let corporations regulate themselves. 5.04 1.77 
Abortion should only be allowed in cases of rape and incest. 5.04 1.64 
The government should not interfere with employment practices at 
businesses like Uber and Postmates. If individual workers don’t like a 
company’s policies, they can work elsewhere. 
5.06 1.27 
If black people tried harder they could be just as well off as White 
people. 
5.09 1.74 
Climate change is not man made. We do not need to significantly 
change our way of life. 
5.10 1.98 
Border camps are an effective deterrent for illegal immigration. 5.11 1.71 
Homelessness is a private problem that should be left to private 
charities and individuals to resolve. 
5.11 1.54 
Universal background checks are not useful. Bad guys will always 
find ways to get guns. 
5.12 1.65 
The government should stay out of the business of healthcare. 5.13 1.66 
Income inequality is not a problem in American society. 5.15 1.66 
We need to protect religious freedom for all Americans. For example, 
a baker should not have to bake a wedding cake for a gay or lesbian 
wedding if they have a religious objection. 
5.20 1.73 
The way to reduce crime is through harsh punishment and policing. 5.23 1.78 
The Second Amendment must be protected for all citizens. 5.24 1.63 





Russian interference in U.S. elections is a hoax that wasted taxpayer 
dollars. 
5.32 1.72 
Federal land should be available for development and oil drilling. 5.35 1.54 
Transgender people should use the bathroom that matches their 
biological sex. 
5.37 1.80 
Student loan debts are the result of personal choices and people 
should be expected to pay them off on their own. 
5.37 1.49 
We need to secure our border and prevent illegal immigration. 5.41 1.65 
We have already addressed any historic harms done to the black 
community. Black Americans need to work hard to fix the problems 
in their own communities. 
5.43 1.47 
We should put more money into funding the military. 5.43 1.61 
The United States should repeal the Affordable Care Act. 5.44 1.73 
The government should not raise taxes on the wealthiest Americans. 5.46 1.72 
Climate change is a hoax. 5.51 1.83 
Abortion should be banned. 5.84 1.88 




Pilot Test 2  
 
Agreement Instructions: In the task to follow we would like you to rate how strongly you 
personally disagree or agree with the point of view expressed in the same set of statements.  
Scale: 1 (Strong disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree).  
 
Receptivity Instructions: In the task to follow we would like you to rate your personal 
reactions to each statement along a scale ranging 0 (Not at All) to 100 (Very Much So).  
Three reactions measured: persuasive, logical, and well-reasoned. 
 







Our current healthcare system is a mess. People are 
too stressed out about going broke to actually get the 
medical care they need. The United States should 











It is not fair that the wealthiest people in the U.S. 
aren’t paying their fair share of taxes. The middle 
class is struggling and the 1% have all the money. 










It is crazy that we still allow people to buy any 
weapon they want. We need to think about the safety 











Americans with student loan debts are struggling to 
make ends meet. They cannot start businesses or buy 
homes while paying off their debts. We need to 













I cannot believe in places like Flint, Michigan people 
still do not have clean drinking water. The 
government should protect public safety. The federal 
government has the responsibility to take care of 
safety concerns like lead pipes and toxic paint in our 










Our criminal justice system is not working. The jails 
are too full and the cost to our communities too high. 
The way to reduce crime is to invest in community 














We have to protect the little guy. We cannot let 
corporations decide how the economy will work 
instead of protecting the middle class. The 
government should regulate the economy to make 











The quality of education that our students receive 
should not vary by what state they live in. The federal 
government should set nationwide metrics for 















The government should stay out of our wallets and 
businesses. It should be easier to do business in 
America, not harder. The government should respect 










Women do not have it bad in the United States. 
American women can go to the same schools, get the 
same jobs, and have all the same rights as men. 











Our federal debt is out of control. We cannot 
continue to spend money we don’t have and then ask 
for more from the taxpayers. We need to cut 










Drug abuse is a huge problem in American society. 
We have to keep drugs out of our communities. The 
government should enforce strict anti-drug laws to 










The law should not protect certain types of people 
over others, or tell Americans how to think. LGBTQ 














Racial inequality is not the average American’s fault 
or their responsibility to fix. We have already 
addressed any historic harms done to the black 
community. Black Americans need to work hard to 











Obamacare is not working. It has made healthcare 
more expensive for the average American and it 
hasn’t improved the quality of care. The United 











   
Any organization that poses a threat to the United 
States needs to be dealt with strongly, with the full 
force of the American military. We have to make 
sure the military is always ready to defend Americans 
against existing and new threats. We should put more 












Every life must be protected. There is no getting 
around the fact that abortion is murder. Abortion 











We have to protect America’s border security and 
American’s lives and jobs. The government should 
tighten our borders, and any person who is in the 
United States illegally should leave. We need to 














Study 1 Dependent Variables  
 
On a scale from 0 (Not at all) to 100 (Very Much so), please provide your judgments of the 
Facebook post above: 
1. Persuasive 
2. Logical  
3. Well-Reasoned  
 
4. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the point of view expressed in the post above? 
a. Strongly disagree 
b. Disagree 
c. Somewhat disagree 
d. Neither agree nor disagree 




5. How likely would you be to send this person a "friend request" on social media? </span> 
a. Extremely unlikely 
b. Moderately unlikely 
c. Slightly unlikely 
d. Neither likely nor unlikely 
e. Slightly likely 
f. Moderately likely 
g. Extremely likely
 
6. How likely would you be to "like" this post on social media 
a. Extremely unlikely 
b. Moderately unlikely 
c. Slightly unlikely 
d. Neither likely nor unlikely 
e. Slightly likely 
f. Moderately likely 
g. Extremely likely 
 
7. On a scale from 0 (Not at all) to 100 (Very Much so), how willing would you be to have a 
follow-up conversation with this person to better understand their opinions on this issue?  
 
8. On a scale from 0 (Not at all) to 100 (Very Much so), how does reading this post make you 
feel? 
a. Happy  
b. Excited  
c. Angry  
d. Frustrated  
e. Content  
f. Annoyed  
g. Disgusted  
h. Proud  
 
9. On a scale from 0 (Not at all) to 100 (Very Much so), how open-minded are you to the 




Study 2 Sample Details  
 
In accordance with the preregistration, after collecting and cleaning the sample I checked the 
number of participants in each category of partisan identity without doing any further analyses. I 
planned to repost the study until each partisan identity category reached 115 participants for a 
total sample of 230. However, after multiple reposts, I was only able to obtain a sample of 108 
Moderately Strong Republicans. During data collection I also gathered a sample of 125 
Moderately Strong Democrats. I chose to address the limited sample of Moderately Strong 
Republicans by increasing the sample of Moderately Strong Democrats to 121 (see table below 
for comparison of intended vs. actual sample).. Again, I had more Democrat participants than 
necessary, so I randomly selected 4 Moderately Strong Democrats to exclude from analyses. 
Random selection was conducted using Research Randomizer (www.randomizer.org), as 
suggested by the Social Psychology Research Network.  




Intended Sample 115 115 














Political Statements  
 
Instructions: In this section we would like you to imagine how you might react to various points 
of view. You will read a description of a hypothetical point of view (e.g., "Imagine a 
conversation in which someone is telling you that they believe public school teachers should 
make more money." ) and describe how you might react or feel. The statements will express a 
variety of opinions on different issues. Please read each one carefully. Afterwards, you will be 
asked to make some ratings of what you just read, using a series of different rating scales. 
 
Imagine someone shared the following opinion: 
 
Strong Liberal: 
a. "It is crazy that we still allow people to buy any weapon they want. We need to think about 
the safety of our kids and communities. We need to ban assault rifles." 
b. "Americans with student loan debts are struggling to make ends meet. They cannot start 
businesses or buy homes while paying off their debts. We need to forgive student loan 
debts for many young Americans." 
Moderate Liberal: 
a. "Our criminal justice system is not working. The jails are too full and the cost to our 
communities too high. The way to reduce crime is to invest in community development 
and education." 
b. "We have to protect the little guy. We cannot let corporations decide how the economy 
will work instead of protecting the middle class. The government should regulate the 
economy to make sure Americans and their interests are protected." 
Moderate Conservative: 
a. "Our federal debt is out of control. We cannot continue to spend money we don't have 
and then ask for more from the taxpayers. We need to cut government programs to 
address the budget deficit." 
b. "Drug abuse is a huge problem in American society. We have to keep drugs out of our 
communities. The government should enforce strict anti-drug laws to deal with drug 
addiction." 
Strong Conservative: 
a. "Obamacare is not working. It has made healthcare more expensive for the average 
American and it hasn't improved the quality of care. The United States should repeal the 
Affordable Care Act." 
b. "Any organization that poses a threat to the United States needs to be dealt with strongly, 
with the full force of the American military. We have to make sure the military is always 
ready to defend Americans against existing and new threats. We should put more money 
into funding the military." 
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Appendix P  
Study 2 Dependent Variables 
 
On a scale from 0 (Not at all) to 100 (Very Much so), how do you think you would judge the 
statement above:  
1. Persuasive 
2. Logical  
3. Well-Reasoned  
 
4. How strongly do you think you would agree or disagree with the point of view stated above? 
 
a. Strongly disagree 
b. Disagree 
c. Somewhat disagree 
d. Neither agree nor disagree 
e. Somewhat agree 
f. Agree 
g. Strongly agree 
 
5. On a scale from 0 (Not at all) to 100 (Very Much so), how willing would you be to have a 
conversation with this person to better understand their opinions on this issue? 
 
6. On a scale from 0 (Not at all) to 100 (Very Much so), how do you think discussing this point 
of view would make you feel? 
 
a. Happy  
b. Excited  
c. Angry  
d. Frustrated  
e. Content  
f. Annoyed  




7. On a scale from 0 (Not at all) to 100 (Very Much so), how open-minded do you think you 
would be to the opinions in this statement?  
 
 
 
 
